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Acting Out Citizenship In Global And Local Contexts

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ACTING OUT CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXTS

by

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Residents of a community make a point of shopping at locally owned businesses or patronizing restaurants using organically grown food. Chanting students gather outside the university president's office, demanding a response to their objections about a curriculum change. A small crowd stands on a street corner, holding signs that call for peace and urge motorists to honk in support.

Examples like these surround us. Individuals use a variety of means - protest, personal choices, public discourse of all varieties - to share and act on their convictions. Often individuals make these expressions of conviction about what they most immediately experience, because they occupy a particular place. Although they may engage with questions of national or global importance - such as questions of resource use, economic policy, the rights of marginalized groups, the responsibilities of one group of people to another - they engage with these questions from a specific location, and from a particular class, heritage, or ideology They respond to these questions as people who are *from* a particular place, physically and metaphorically. They want to create change around them, or they want to work with others near them to create change elsewhere.

We do not always recognize examples like those above as the acts of concerned citizens, however. Instead, responses are as varied as the examples themselves. Some of their fellow citizens are apathetic in response, others are inspired or approving, and still others are irritated or hostile. These responses often seem disconnected from the acts of public discourse themselves, though, and are more likely to be prompted by our feelings about the content. Our admiration and irritation have more to do with what we think of the convictions of the individuals than with what we think of their actions. If we express sympathy for protesters or a movement, it stems

more from our shared ambivalence or opposition toward the object of their protest or support, than because we value protest itself as a means of expression. And when we disagree with the convictions of these individuals, we often dismiss their arguments or demands entirely and focus only on the inconvenience of disruptiveness of their actions.

This dismissal is possible, because normally when we think of citizenship, we imagine a collection of rights regulated and upheld by official institutions. Under this definition, acts like those opening this chapter may well count as expressions of conviction, but they do not necessarily count as performances of citizenship. In contrast to this definition, I argue that what it means to be a citizen is best understood as the ability and desire to work on public problems with others. In what follows, I will discuss the modern citizen as a concept that grows out of and exists in relationship to the nation-state. Although the nation-state is defined by borders, by place, it has led to a citizenship in which the concrete place of the "state" is often swept aside in favor of the abstract place of the "nation." The nation-state as we know it, however, is changing under the conditions of globalization, and in spite of the potential for citizenship to evolve alongside the changing nation-state, our official definitions of citizenship are still most likely to emphasize the nation, to manifest through institutions. I will describe as well what this institutional citizenship looks like and suggest some of the ways that these institutions are inadequate for our lived experience of citizenship. In this project, I look closely at three examples - consumption, protest, and revolution - which will serve as the case studies for investigating citizenship. In these examples, as with those that open this chapter, the individuals involved act not as citizens of an abstract nation, but as residents in a particular place, seeking solutions or change. Finally, I want to look at how my field, rhetoric, has viewed citizenship and discuss some of the implications for my project. How we understand citizenship seems

increasingly important today, as a general cry of dismay goes up bemoaning low voter turnout, and politically disengaged young people. I would not be the first to suggest that civic participation, rather than declining, has simply stepped to the side. If this is so, it seems crucial that we be able to recognize alternative possibilities for civic engagement, rather than dismissing them.

MODERN CITIZENSHIP

Current notions of the citizen are tied to the nation-state, the birth of which is often traced to the peace of Westphalia, the name given to the treaties signed in 1648 after the Thirty Years War. This treaty renders all states legally equal, requiring that they recognize both the boundaries of other states and the rights of other states within those boundaries. In doing so, states agree to take a non-interventionist approach to the internal affairs of their fellow states, and accept that they will receive the same treatment in turn. The nation-state is thus defined by boundaries; it relies on them both as a concept and as a physical space. In her work on nation-states, Saskia Sassen argues that they are assemblages of territory, authority, and rights, but calls territory "the most crucial capability" for the formation of the nation-state ("Neither global" 69). Carlo Bordoni describes the nation-state as the combination of an abstract "nation" with a concrete "state." The nation is often defined by a shared culture, language or languages, and way of life, but the members of a nation seek to exercise autonomy and freedom of movement "within that space that they feel belongs to them." This space that belongs to them is the state. As Bordoni puts it, "Nationhood is a feeling or state of mind, but the state - more pragmatically - needs a territory in which to take root." The citizen both belongs to that territory and shares the culture of others within it, is both of that state and of that nation.

It is unsurprising, then, that our definitions of citizenship within the nation-state are rooted in what we do within the territory which belongs to us, or which we belong to. To be born in a place, or to be born to parents who are from a place, is usually sufficient to attain automatic citizenship. Rather than undergoing a process of *becoming* a citizen, often we are simply granted automatic citizenship as a result of being born within these recognized boundaries. This is a departure from the thoughts of scholars like Aristotle, who argues in the *Politics that* citizenship is about both place and participation. Even he, though, is quick to establish that "the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of the state" is a power that confers citizenship only in "that state" (Bk. 3, Pt. 1). Once outside the borders, or once stripped of that power, the individual ceases to be a citizen. The citizen, like the state, needs a place to play out.

For this reason, the citizen is often set in contrast to the denizen - who, while also residing in a particular territory, may not enjoy the same rights or have access to the same opportunities to take part in governing the state. Questions of immigration often invoke the denizen as someone who occupies a particular location while enjoying only limited rights and privileges. As Rachel Ida Buff argues, the evolution of the citizen is in many ways defined by those who do not hold citizenship, "those who do not benefit from its protections and rights" (8). If the denizen sometimes appears as someone *unable* to take part in decision-making, though, the term is also used to describe those who *choose* not to make full use of the rights and protections afforded by citizenship. In a 2013 piece in *The Seattle Star*, Omar Willey claims that while Seattle is awash in denizens, citizens are thin on the ground. Increasingly, he argues, we "fail to become citizens," choosing to "simply exist in a city," rather than accepting the allegiance and responsibilities that would mean full citizenship. To suggest that the denizen is a "failed" or "lazy" citizen is problematic, but what I'm concerned with here is Willey's sense that both exist

as members of the same territory, differing only in what they are able to do or choose to do. The two shape one another, and the point at which they meet is the place they share.

A more positive view of the denizen might be that of Freeman House, who defines the citizen as a "creature of the invented world," while the denizen is "a participant in unfolding creation" (qtd. in Babcock). He uses this distinction to discuss the denizen's superior integration into its environment, its greater awareness of the reality underneath the "invented world." The invented world contains institutions rather than natural forces, and operates with boundaries that are at times arbitrary - while the citizen sees state or national borders, the denizen knows that these lines may be meaningless in an ecological or geographic sense. In questions of development, or responsible use of resources, it is the denizen who is best placed to see that NIMBY is useless - the backyard is another invented boundary, one not recognized by contamination and other forms of environmental destruction.

Even for House, though, inside the realm of the invented world, it is the citizen "who makes the decisions: about land use and zoning, how we care for and protect each other;" in short, the citizen determines the shape of the invented world. While the denizen may have more awareness of their environment, the invented world cannot be simply dismissed - the effects of elections, ordinances, building permits, and boundaries have very real consequences, both good and bad, on "unfolding creation." As with Bordoni's definition of the nation-state above, both the abstract and the concrete are in play here, and the invented world of the nation shapes the concrete world of the state.

DESTABILIZED BORDERS

If citizenship is tied to the existence of the nation-state, though, it stands to reason that a change in one will ripple through the other, and many scholars have described the destabilizing

effects of globalization on the nation-state. Bordoni argues that the idea of a "national community" is called into question as "security, defense of privilege, identity, recognition of culture" all become uncertain and fragmented. And Sassen argues that the privatization of formerly government-run services, and a general withdrawal away from the welfare-state model means that citizens may also feel greater distance from, and less loyalty to, a state that seems increasingly more interested in corporate individuals than the flesh and blood variety. This distance works in combination with a loss of privacy and security to undermine national identity. Whereas once citizens could feel relatively confident that they would be seen as loyal to the state even if resident aliens or immigrants were not, now all are monitored and all are suspect ("Incompleteness" 232-3).

Moreover, the nation-state can no longer be said to consist of a shared culture, language, and way of life, if in fact it ever could. Diasporic communities, once thought of as exceptions, are increasingly common, while it is the "historically hegemonic" who retreat into homogenous suburbs and gated communities (Bordoni). Diasporic identities, dual citizenship, and evolving ideas about global human rights allow us to further remove ourselves from the national community. To claim that human rights exist on a global level allows us to appeal outside of the state for satisfaction or justice. It also throws a wrench in an already-shaky policy of non-intervention, as both genuinely concerned and self-interested parties seek to justify military action (like the US-led war in Iraq approved by the U.N. in 1991) in the name of humanitarianism.

Further breakdown in the policy of non-intervention also underscores ways that not just the nation as an idea or feeling but also the state as a physical territory has become porous. The boundaries of states have never posed much of an obstacle to the ruling classes, but the

deepening and widening of transnational ties under neoliberal globalization has further reduced the barriers of borders (Harvey 35). Capital, information, and jobs move fluidly from one place to another, as does labor, although boundaries remain more solid for those outside the ruling classes. While territory may continue to define the state in our minds, the absolute authority understood to reign within that territory is no longer assured. Human rights groups seek to establish global rights above and beyond those allowed by the state, and multinational corporations work with governments to gain authority at the sites of their overseas operations. States are also increasingly subject to entities such as the WTO or the IMF, which cut across the division between national and global, as do attempts to regulate global capitalism and limit its exploitation of workers and resources.

The end result is that citizenship and its relationship to place have become increasingly fraught. House's division makes the citizen the inhabitant not of a real place, but of an invented world. Although definitions of citizenship often tie it explicitly to place, these ties to place often come down to paperwork establishing where we were born, where we are licensed to drive a car or practice a trade, where we own property or work, where we are registered to vote. The denizen may live in the state, but only the citizen is a resident of the nation. As the nation-state is destabilized, citizenship is likewise destabilized. The nation is moving away from the state, and as it does, what it means to be a citizen is increasingly defined more by our legal and political rights than by our participation in a shared culture. T. H. Marhsall's 1950 definition of citizenship, one of the most commonly referenced, breaks citizenship down into three elements: legal citizenship, civic citizenship, and social citizenship. For Marshall, legal rights are important, as is the ability Aristotle mentions to participate in the administration of the state, either by holding office or by voting on those who will, but citizens must have not only the

ability but also the opportunity to participate in order to be full citizens. Without social citizenship, the education, time, and means to make use of legal and civic citizenship, citizens cannot fully participate. For Marshall, though, location means little, except in the sense that being in a place (a democracy rather than a monarchy or authoritarian state, for instance, or living in one country over another) gives us access to these rights. David Fleming argues in *City of Rhetoric* that when we imagine citizenship we tend to conjure up an image of "the ordinary man or woman who is, by right, a full and equal member of the polity, who enjoys its benefits and shares in its governance, participates in its decision making, serves in its military, sits on its juries, and obeys its laws (without ever giving up his or her right to complain and dispute)" (19). Location exists here largely in the phrase "by right," inasmuch as it is likely to be residence in a place or descent from a place that bestows all else.

THE INSTIUTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Fleming suggests that we've been seduced by placelessness, and through this seduction we've bought into a citizenship that seems to promise equality but delivers impotence. In the United States and other democracies, citizenship is often composed of specific procedures or institutions. The responsibilities we hold toward the deliberative and judicial administration of the state tend to translate into voting, paying taxes, jury duty, military service - in short, responsibilities to institutions, often the same institutions that uphold and protect our rights. In dealing with these institutions, we believe we will all be treated the same: we will all receive the same drivers' test, and all receive one vote at our polling station. As mentioned above, Marshall was greatly concerned with the social aspect of citizenship, but even for him that aspect is largely managed through institutions - financial aid for struggling families, worker protection, adequate education for even the poorest children - so that all can interact knowledgeably and

responsibly with the institutions of legal and civic citizenship. Marshall was optimistic in 1950 that as more institutions arose, all three aspects of citizenship would be available to everyone, and that finally we might approach a society leaving no one out.

For most people, however, institutional citizenship is too big, too remote, and happens most often at the level of the nation. As Fleming argues, "In large, diverse societies, ruled by professional politicians and powerful interests, managed by technical experts, and supervised by the mass media, the issues of public debate are huge, complex, and attention-grabbing; conflicts are stark, and heated, and considerable resources are available to deal with them. But as lively as all this is, it can seem remote from the point of view of the individual citizen, who is usually little more than a spectator of it" (38). While it may seem as if citizens are engaging with difference and conflict when they participate at the national level, they often participate indirectly, sometimes by casting a vote (depending on the issue and the citizen) but more often simply by having an opinion on it all as they wait for events to play out. This lack of engagement with difference, moreover, means that institutional citizenship is both very large and very, very small. Because it happens so remotely, citizens watch issues unfold rather than participating in creating the conversation around those issues, and end by focusing on their own opinion, and their own vote.

Citizens have more power, to participate and to create change, at the local level, in smaller publics, but these publics often suffer from a lack of diversity, as well as limited power over the events that most concern citizens (Fleming 38). Running for local office or participating in town hall meetings allows citizens to feel more engaged, but in doing so they are less likely to encounter individuals and groups "not like" themselves. Moreover, while they may be able to exercise control over local questions (whether to allow a big-box store to occupy a particular

location, for example), they can do little from this level about questions of development in

general, even when that development happens in areas close enough to their own for direct

impact. Because local politics is also governed largely by institutions and procedure, and these

procedures do not necessarily allow the average citizen to influence large decisions, the sense of

being embedded in place may be largely illusion.

In a quote of some length, Fleming spells out how ludicrous our quest for a placeless

citizenship is, even when prompted by honorable goals. As he puts it,

> We want our public realm to be as open, accessible, and inclusive as possible, and
> political rights and responsibilities to be a function of laws and procedures rather than the
> attributes or attachments of particular, spatiotemporally situated men and women...As a
> citizen, in other words, the individual is lifted out of the particularities of his or her
> earthly position, drained of personal history, family resources, religious faith, and
> physical attributes, and transformed into a self-contained rational being, floating in a
> space of neutral laws and abstract procedures to which he or she has (apparently)
> assented. (21)

Put this way, the idea that we could leave our particularities behind when we come before the

government, or that it could deal with us as if we don't carry those particularities around with us,

seems impossible, to say nothing of how often attempting to eliminate difference results only in a

system that privileges those with no difference - citizens who are white, male, middle-class.

Even if we could isolate citizens from the conditions and attributes that shape them as

individuals, this is not how most of us experience our citizenship. As the boundaries of national

identities and nation-states have become porous, the boundaries of citizenship as it is understood

today have also begun to bleed. Far from being limited to institutions, the proliferation of rights

talk today means that the realm of the citizen has spread to cover more and more ground, so that

" a dimension of citizenship has come to color everything" (Schudson 299). Moreover, even if

institutions strip us of difference, many of us still come to those institutions with a particular

orientation, or come to them at all, because of our difference. The attributes we wish to eliminate

are also what determine our faith in or skepticism about the power of voting, our belief or disbelief in the justice of the courts, our inclination or disinclination to join or support the military. Even in dealing with institutions, we remain situated.

EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP

But we also enact citizenship through unofficial channels. Gerard Hauser points out in *Vernacular Voices* that while many of us do express ourselves through institutions, like voting, we are just as likely to participate through "exercising [our] buying power, demonstrations of sympathy or opposition, adornments of colored ribbon, debates in classrooms and on factory floors, speeches on library steps or letters to the editor, correspondence with public officials, and with other expressions of stance and judgment" (33). I would add to this list clothing choices, body modifications like tattoos, bumper stickers, eating habits, even where we choose to live.

Other scholars support the notion that citizenship, far from taking place in a remote, neutral realm, is something as situated as we are. Richard Marback argues that "Citizenship is experienced through action, an embodied activity of being in and moving about in a world filled with other people and many things," so that "what people do matters more for their understandings of themselves as citizens than the descriptions of citizenship given them by law" (Ch. 5). Danielle Allen says simply that "ordinary habits *are* the stuff of citizenship" (12). These scholars suggest that citizenship is both institutional and everyday, existing inside and outside of official channels. What all of the scholars above have in common is a belief that citizenship requires that we exercise judgment, and then take steps to communicate and act on that judgment with others.

In this project, three case studies examine the tension between citizenship as an ideal and citizenship as a lived experience. I examine situations where individuals perform their

citizenship both as members of an abstract nation that grants them political and legal rights, and as residents of a physical place. They operate, following House, as denizens rather than, or in addition to, citizens. I look closely at participation in buy-local movements, organized protest, and revolution as performances of citizenship, arguing that they should be recognized as such because they represent attempts to work with others on solutions to public problems. Examples from these categories demonstrate how fraught they can be, as performances of citizenship. In spite of attempts to boycott businesses like BP and Chick-Fil-A , and in spite of bumper stickers exhorting us to buy American, and the increasing number of buy-local movements, often personal choices about which businesses we patronize remain personal, and as such they are stripped of their political significance. We may have heard the phrase "vote with our dollars," but we do not necessarily attach the same importance to personal choices in consumption or patronage as we do to casting a vote. And while apathetic citizens of all parties are encouraged to make their voices heard at the polls, when those same citizens make their voices heard by taking to the streets it becomes unclear whether their actions are virtuous or merely a nuisance. The Occupy Wall Street movement illustrates this. For those who approved of the movement and what it stood for, Occupiers were exercising good citizenship, while those who disapproved regarded them as lazy and ungrateful, too busy whining in the streets with their iPhones to get jobs like the upstanding citizens they inconvenienced with their protests. These reactions suggest both that a good citizen who sympathizes with the movement *must* Occupy their city, and that a good citizen, no matter their sympathies, cannot possibly participate in Occupy. Taken together, these examples demonstrate how the shifting definition of citizenship becomes a way to dismiss forms of public discourse we disapprove of or disagree with.

Chapter 2 looks at the Keep Louisville Weird movement in Louisville, KY. Although buy local movements are rooted in consumerism and stem in large part from economic concerns, the rhetoric used by and about these movements suggests that for participants, shopping locally is an engagement with questions about what our cities should look like, and what our economic responsibilities as citizens are. I argue that limited ideas about the rhetorical situation in which KLW functions work to reduce advocates of the movement to consumers exercising individual preferences. Drawing on Jenny Rice's model of rhetorical ecologies and Sara Ahmed's idea of "stickiness", I trace some of the ways KLW has influenced and been influenced by other markers of place, allowing it to function as a performance of citizen identity.

In the third chapter, I examine reactions to the 1999 demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle, WA, including news articles, accounts by participants, and Stuart Townsend's 2007 film *Battle in Seattle*. I argue that both sides get caught up in a "war of words," where they form competing narratives about what happened during the demonstrations, who did (or failed to do), accomplished (or failed to accomplish) what. The rhetoric used by participants and supporters, including Townsend's film, paints demonstrators as heroes or warriors who triumphantly vanquished the WTO. The opposing side labels those who took to the streets childish and naive, or violent and criminal, arguing that they accomplished very little save property damage. Neither of these positions allows for a discussion of protest as an act of civic engagement, as the conflict is described using warlike language – to be expected perhaps, of the Battle in Seattle. Instead, I propose that conflict could be more productively viewed through Kenneth Burke's notion of "co-operative competition," which involves a willingness to engage with dissenting voices respectfully, as participants who are open to being transformed through the conversation. While

some participants speak to experiencing this transformation, these moments are often lost in the rhetoric of warfare.

The final case study focuses on what is called the Arab Spring, the series of protests and revolutions starting in late 2010. In particular, I look at an artifact from *The Economist*, "The Shoe-Throwers' Index," which attempts to calculate and rank the instability of Arab League nations. I argue that the Index makes use of a rhetoric of predictability or mathematics which suggests that revolution is stimulus response. Under this logic, citizens are content when they receive certain rights and enjoy certain opportunities - a logic that in itself suggests that all citizens will respond similarly to circumstances. As a counter-example, I look at the rhetoric used on Wael Ghonim's Facebook page, "Kullena Khaled Said," which allows participants to be situated locally, while identifying with a larger pan-Arabic sentiment. Although they join the Index in arguing that citizens will not be content when they lack freedoms and opportunities, they use this information to make connections across the region.

The examples I have chosen for this project are arranged in order of increasingly inclusiveness - from Keep Louisville Weird's concern solely with Louisville (and an abbreviated version of Louisville, at that), to Seattle's concern both with global practices enabled by the WTO and with making a stand in this particular city, and finally to the pan-Arabic rhetoric used by participants of the Arab Spring. In all of these examples, participants act as members of a community, whether local or global, and they themselves are very clear about the civic-mindedness of their actions. But as Willey's comments suggest, our discourse about citizenship is framed by an emphasis on the institutions of the nation, so that protesters in 1999 count as denizens, but only become citizens if (or when) they are voting regularly. As a result of the

rhetoric commonly used about citizenship, there is conflict as others try to account for the actions of those who operate outside of institutions.

RHETORIC AND CITIZENSHIP

Rhetoric's interest in citizenship, and its connection to public deliberation, goes back to the beginning of the discipline. In an introduction to the works of Isocrates, Michael Gagarin describes the impact of rhetorical instruction on 5th and 4th century Greece by pointing out that the political and legal systems of the time required direct participation from a large number of citizens, which meant that "all important decisions were made by these large bodies, and the primary means of influencing these decisions was oratory" (xii). The ability to speak persuasively, then, would have been crucial in influencing these important decisions. In the *Politics*, Aristotle defines the citizen, above all, as someone "who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of the state" (Bk. 3, Pt. 1), explicitly connecting the idea of citizenship with access to forums for public speech. Early scholars and teachers in the rhetorical arts were concerned with teaching promising Athenians how to use oratory to gain political influence, but many were also concerned with creating not just good orators but good citizens as well - individuals who would utilize and respond to persuasive speech virtuously.

The question of rhetoric's role in fostering citizenship would also be taken up in Classical Roman rhetoric. Quintillian asks in the *Institutio Oratoria* whether it is necessarily true that rhetorical skill and civic virtue go hand in hand, a question that his predecessors had grappled with, and which still haunts scholars in rhetoric and composition today. Richard Lanham refers to this as the "Q Question," the question that everyone pursuing the study or transmission of the humanities must face: are good speakers also good people, and thus good citizens? In the *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintillian laments the possibility that eloquent speakers can be bad people,

saying that "if the powers of eloquence serve only to lend arms to crime, there can be nothing more pernicious than eloquence to public and private lives alike," and that Nature itself has betrayed us if "her greatest gift to man" (language) becomes "the accomplice of crime, the foe to innocency and the enemy of truth" (Quintillian 356-7). Ultimately, he determines that this cannot be the case and that not only *should* a good orator be a good man, but only a good man *can* become a skilled speaker - only a mind free of vice and guilt could sufficiently apply itself to mastering this greatest of gifts.

Many of those who follow Quintillian share his belief that rhetorical instruction can foster good citizenship, albeit for different reasons. The conversation about the connection between citizenship and deliberation, and the belief that instruction in the latter can lead to greater virtue in the former, continues today in the field of composition. In the 80s, James Berlin's "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class" criticizes what he calls "cognitive rhetoric," a means of writing instruction that he says teaches students to achieve goals without questioning them or the values they hold. While this is a far cry from Quintillian's insistence that rhetorical skill in and of itself is a virtuous thing, Berlin's argument is for a reform, not rejection, of rhetoric. Berlin promotes what he calls social epistemic rhetoric, through which (and through critical pedagogy) a number of scholars (among them Kenneth Burke, Lester Faigley, and Ira Shor) argue that rhetoric is a political act and should be used "for social change, not only to empower individual students or to provide access for underrepresented minorities, but to address explicitly in the composition class questions of political conviction and to work against inequities in society" (Durst 126). So while rhetorical instruction in and of itself might not make for good citizens, the right kind of instruction can be a force for social justice.

Even scholars who are skeptical of critical pedagogy are often reluctant to dismiss its emphasis on the political nature of rhetoric. Both Richard Miller and Russel Durst highlight student resistance to critical pedagogy, and our obligation to prepare students for the job market as well as the picket line, but both also determine that it is possible to work toward both goals - to create both good job candidates and good citizens in the writing classroom. In a piece for *College English*, Amy Wan acknowledges that, given the connection between hard-working employees and dutiful citizens, while we don't all agree on what kind of citizens we're creating, or what kind we ought to create, composition instructors have had a hand in citizen creation all along, whether by promoting job skills or by promoting civic engagement.

Rhetoric's interest as a field has been not only in how rhetorical instruction fosters citizenship, but also in how our everyday ways of talking about citizenship and public problems influence our civic identities and actions. Many of these scholars suggest that there is a crisis of citizenship that can't be dismissed as voter apathy, but is a result of the language and institutions that shape citizenship. Dana Cloud argues that just as neoliberal policies have privatized services for citizens, therapeutic discourses have privatized our troubles. Rather than recognizing problems such as poverty, increasing unstable employment or unemployment, or urban blight as systemic problems or social concerns, such language asks us to focus on ourselves, to manage or master our depression and anger as individuals rather than allowing it to drive us to demand change. She argues that this discourse damages civic engagement by framing problems such as racism or poverty as forces of nature, and encourages us to "retreat from the public struggle for even modest reforms in favor of private wound-licking" (160). Defining our hardships as immutable and encouraging us to look first to ourselves for solutions not only stops us from asking if things could be otherwise or demanding change, but cuts us off from others - except as

members of a support group, all working as individuals on fixing themselves. Both deliberation and collectivity suffer.

Other scholars see a similar isolation. Fleming's *City of Rhetoric* says outright that our very communities are organized in ways that discourage us from interacting with one another. Sharon Crowley argues that adherents of opposing ideologies talk past one another, refusing to engage, and that many of us are increasingly reluctant to bring up controversial topics for fear of damaging relationships or making a scene. Brian Garsten makes a similar point, saying that as politics becomes increasingly dominated by like-minded people speaking only to each other, we become alienated and our trust in the power of persuasion or judgment suffers. Garsten even suggests that *concerns* about citizenship and concerns about rhetoric are similarly intertwined. He believes that modern skepticism about rhetoric is tied to "a crisis of confidence about citizens' capacity to exercise political judgment in public deliberations" (Garsten, Introduction). If citizens cannot be trusted to make good decisions, rhetoric's ability to persuade becomes dangerous. Rather than avoiding persuasion, though, he argues that we must tame it through familiarity and use. And like Cloud or Crowley, he believes that more, not less, deliberation is the way to increase civic participation, and that the field of rhetoric has something to contribute in showing us how to deliberate productively.

In approaching this project, I have brought the questions and concerns of my field with me. Like many writing instructors, I see a civic dimension to my work in the classroom. The definition of citizenship I employ, that of being able and willing to engage with others about public problems, is a definition heavily influenced by scholars like those listed above. I am concerned as well with how the discourses around us shape our understanding of what it means to be a good citizen, or, as in the examples of the coming chapters, to be a citizen at all.

And like them I believe that rhetoric has something to offer in showing us how to deliberate with one another. Far from being a means for manipulating an emotional and easily-led citizenry (although to open the door to persuasion is obviously to risk allowing manipulation in as well), I consider rhetoric the best and most ethical hope for engaging with citizens. Rather than simply encouraging us to be rational or reasonable, and thus to go along with others, persuasion "requires us to engage with others *wherever they stand* and begin our argument there" (Garsten, Introduction, italics mine). Rhetoric is our best hope for a politics that doesn't alienate people or ignore their real lives. I argue that citizenship is situated - it is influenced by our everyday lives, and takes place through our everyday actions. Our situatedness means we will be different, and we will differ, and there will be conflict, if our democracy is inclusive enough to allow all to have a say. As scholars like Chantal Mouffe argue, if that conflict is to be productive, we would be best served by a agonistic relationship, where we see one another not as enemies, but as adversaries. It is rhetoric that can help us have these relationships, because it is rhetoric that encourages us to start where others are, encourages us to start at their situatedness when we try to persuade them, and which allows us to see others as fellow, even if dissenting, citizens rather than as enemies or criminals.

Chapter 2 Rhetorical Ecology in the "Keep Louisville Weird" Movement

Like any other Louisville teenager, I was aware that one of the coolest things you could do was walk up and down the section of Bardstown Road that runs through the Highlands. My memories of this neighborhood, an assemblage of funky old houses, set behind six or seven blocks of eccentric shops and restaurants, are likely comparable to those of other Louisville natives. As young adults, we roved up and down in packs, smoking and window shopping, occasionally buying something. I bought my first pair of drumsticks at The Doo-Wop Shop, had my first cup of coffee at the now-departed Twice Told Coffeehouse, and bought CDs at ear X-tacy.

When, in 2003, I first saw the billboard that read "Keep Louisville Weird," I thought immediately of ear X-tacy. Other than those words, the unsigned message said nothing, directed the reader nowhere. The words, however, used the same color scheme and font as ear X-tacy's logo, so I immediately connected the billboard and the store. Soon enough, ear X-tacy customers who reached the same conclusion began to sport the bumper stickers and t-shirts they purchased at the record store, becoming ambulatory billboards. The phrase spread, along with the story behind it. Inspired by the success of the Keep Austin Weird campaign in Texas, ear X-tacy's owner, John Timmons, had called his own Crusade to keep Louisvillians from deserting stores like his in favor of chains like Best Buy, a decision prompted as much by his belief in the importance of stores like ear X-tacy to the community as from his desire to maintain his livelihood.

In what follows, I will discuss some of the arguments made for and about buy local movements such as Keep Louisville Weird. Taking Louisville as my case study, I will analyze rhetoric used by and about the movement. Although for some, Keep Louisville Weird functions

exclusively as a means to increase local sales, I believe that to examine it only in these terms relies on a simplification of the rhetorical situation. Jenny Edbauer Rice argues that previous notions of the rhetorical situation assume that elements such as audience or exigence are identifiable and firmly bounded. Instead, she suggests understanding public rhetoric as circulating in a network or ecology - models in which it can be difficult to identify any one element and in which public rhetoric can have unpredictable consequences. Her 2005 article, "Unframing Models of Public Distribution," takes as its example the buy-local movement in Austin, Texas which inspired Timmons to create Keep Louisville Weird. While Rice is interested in using Keep Austin Weird to demonstrate the difficulty of locating discrete elements of a rhetorical situation and to demonstrate what an ecological approach might look like, I am using her work in combination with Sara Ahmed's notion of the "stickiness" of signs to trace some of the ways that Keep Louisville Weird influences and is influenced by other examples of public rhetoric. Changing how we view the rhetorical situation allows us to examine the ways that Keep Louisville Weird functions as an expression of citizenship, as it circulates alongside other artifacts that help to construct Louisvillians' civic identities, and creates space for rethinking how we define citizenship.

WHY BUY LOCAL?

Like Timmons, I have a personal stake in a weird Louisville. I was born and lived there until 2007; I can recall seeing the very first signs of the campaign and watching it consume first the Highlands, and then Crescent Hill. But my interest is not limited to hometown pride. Louisville is by no means unique, but rather an example of a growing trend. The last decade has seen an increased interest in the local and the self-sustaining all over the country, as faltering

union strength, outsourcing, and an increase in part-time and contract work add to both unemployment statistics and the anxieties of the still-employed. Citing globalization as the source of job loss and falling wages, many have turned from the global to the local for solutions and resistance. While localization can take many forms, perhaps the most common is that which urges supporting and expanding local businesses in a community, usually by encouraging residents to support these businesses (exclusively, ideally) over chains or franchises.

Many of the arguments for buying locally concern economics. One of the most common claims by localization enthusiasts is that local businesses profit a community more in the long run than chains and franchises by keeping more money circulating locally and giving more back to the community. Jeff Milchen, co-founder of the American Independent Business Alliance (AMIBA), cites the "multiplier effect" as one of the reasons citizens should support local businesses over chains. Milchen argues that "Dollars spent at community-based merchants create a multiplier effect in the local economy, meaning from each dollar spent at a local independent merchant, three or more times as much typically goes back into the local economy compared to a dollar spent at chain-owned businesses" (Milchen). Local businesses are more likely to hire local talent to build, repair, adorn, and staff their businesses, and to use local media for their advertisements, multiplying the number of transactions within a community. AMIBA references a 2003 survey of economic impact taken by its Austin, TX branch, which "concluded for every $100 spent at a chain, $13 remained in the community while $45[1] remained when spent with home town businesses" (AMIBA). A more recent study, conducted in Louisville in 2012 suggests that it's closer to $55. (Civic Economics Indie Impact Study Series).This much-cited survey appears in both Stacy Mitchell's *Big-Box Swindle*, and Michael Shuman's *The Small-Mart Revolution*, popular books encouraging localization, as well as on the websites of multiple

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[1]

organizations affiliated with AMIBA. In stressing that buying locally keeps money circulating in a community, advocates argue not just that local merchants spend locally, on wages, ads, suppliers, and construction, but more importantly, local businesses do not have corporate headquarters six states away to send their profits to.

These arguments do not stand unchallenged however, nor are they unproblematic. The vice president of communication for the International Franchise Association, Terry Hill, argues that "most franchises are run by local owners who also give back to their communities and spend money near home" (qtd. in C. Lynch). And although he claims that local businesses deliver benefits like these more reliably, Shuman at least admits that "nearly all kinds of businesses offer a community the benefit of jobs, tax dollars, charitable contributions, and local economic stimulus" (Shuman 9). Even AMIBA concedes that "some chains give back to towns in which they do business, and not all local businesses are exemplary models" (AMIBA). These claims suggest both that while buying local in general may benefit a community, particular instances of buying local do not necessarily do so, and that not every dollar spent at other businesses ends up elsewhere.

What seems less debatable is information indicating that local businesses in cities with active buy-local campaigns do better than those in cities without ("Independent"). A December 2008 *Courier-Journal* article, which calls Louisville's recent emphasis on the local "a miniature of the national picture," notes that while a few stores in the Keep Louisville Weird alliance are worse off than before, most are holding ground steadily, and others thriving (Puckett). A month later, another piece reports that holiday sales for stores in buy local movements were stronger than those with no such affiliations. Although local businesses still saw a (to be expected) drop from pre-bailout 2007 holiday sales, the drop in 2008 was only by 3.2%, whereas independent

retailers without movement support dropped by 5.6% ("Independent"). More interestingly, perhaps, a survey by the Institute for Local Self-Reliance found that while independent retailers lost 5% in sales nationally, they did substantially better than chains like Barnes and Noble, Best Buy, The Gap, and Williams-Sonoma, which lost 7.7%, 6.5%, 14%, and 24.2% respectively ("Independent"). If these numbers can be relied on, they indicate not only that buy local movements benefit independent businesses, but that even in cases where no such movement is present, the last few years have seen a general turn away from chains toward indigenous business.

To return to my earlier point, then, while there's some evidence of economic benefit in buying locally, it's difficult to say exactly how much, or which local businesses reliably provide it. Rhetoric in support of local businesses combines claims about economic concerns with claims that extend beyond that realm. Appeals are often made to the "priceless" advantages of strong community, while chains are criticized for appealing to shoppers purely as consumers rather than citizens. Although chains often offer lower prices, and consumers have an understandable desire to make their budgets stretch further –especially today- those who support localization urge them not to exchange their homes and local cultures for short-term savings. Mitchell argues that neighborhoods with higher numbers of local businesses have assets such as a "richer civic life," and a "wider variety of jobs." And small businesses, buy-local enthusiasts say, don't just bring money to a community, they also bring what Mitchell calls "social capital," networks of economic and social support. These businesses "nurture informal interaction" and "foster empathy, camaraderie and a sense of responsibility for one another" (Mitchell 80). These arguments ask us to shift our perspective - reject saving more for yourself on a particular trip in favor of keeping more money circulating in the community; choose economic transactions, even

if they're not maximized by local businesses, that are nonetheless being delivered more humanely by these businesses.

Groups like AMIBA, and authors like Mitchell and Shuman, argue that what they offer is a vision of ourselves that competes with the one thrust on us by Big-Box chains. These retailers have become as powerful as they are in part "by getting people to assume the narrow role of consumer," obscuring the issue of their impact on our communities by making the conversation one limited to our consumption of goods (Mitchell 205). The more we are encouraged to view ourselves as consumers first and citizens second, they suggest, the less likely we are to make community a priority. Because local businesses are rooted in the community, and tied to its fate, unlike a chain, which can always go elsewhere, they are less likely to "sacrifice valuable community assets, such as a beautiful view or the quiet of a neighborhood" (Mitchell 88). They have to live here too, after all, and thus have goals other than making money. Choices made with only profits in mind lead to irresponsible uses of land and resources, with the result that "cheap goods and services" become "more important than endangered species, beautiful wilderness, local democracy, historic preservation, downtown aesthetics, even more important than religion" (Shuman 38). As well, advocates such as Shuman have argued that becoming more self-sufficient insulates a community from economic downturns and corruption or incompetence in central government, and in a more extreme moment he points out that a community which is autonomous with regard to food, electricity, and water is less vulnerable to terrorist attacks (53). The development that accompanies the cheap goods and services at chains sometimes come at the cost of our homes, and if we would preserve them, we must turn toward the local.

Preserving our homes is defined here not just as literally keeping them safe (from harmful development, or terrorist attacks), but also as keeping them recognizable, by preserving our

"unique culture, foods, ecology, architecture, history, music, and art," keeping them from being "steamroll[ed] with retail monocultures" (Shuman 57). Most of us are familiar with the experience Jenny Rice describes in the opening pages of *Distant Publics,* that of traveling on highways where signs encourage us to visit the same chains - Target, Home Depot, McDonald's, Subway - that we can find at home. And although stores like these are touted as job-producers, buy local advocates point out that gaining a Barnes & Noble or a Best Buy often means that small, locally-owned stores can't compete and eventually fold. The gain must then be set not only against the loss of those jobs, but also against the loss of diversity. Funky bookstores promoting local authors and history are replaced by the same bestsellers on display at every Barnes & Noble. Niche electronic, computer, and record stores bow to the sprawling convenience of Best Buy. Even if the loss and gain of jobs and income balances out, we find that our town begins to lose its distinctiveness and resemble any other town. The question then, for buy-local supporters, is whether we can possibly save enough on goods and services at chains to compensate us for the loss of priceless things like our communities and culture.

KEEP LOUISVILLE WEIRD

Concerns like these are what prompted the owner of ear X-tacy to start the Keep Louisville Weird movement. Timmons admits that he originally opened the record store while he "figure[d] out what I was going to do for a career," but the store took root, and its logo "[became] one of the most recognizable icons" in the city (Bickers). In the first 20 years after it's opening in 1985, ear X-tacy became a Louisville institution, operating as a hangout for music lovers, and a symbol of hope for other local business owners. Aside from providing a place to buy music, ear X-tacy made a point of supporting Kentuckiana[2] musicians by maintaining a sizable collection of local artists, promoting shows, and even running a record label affiliated

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[2] Kentucky/Indiana

with the store. Customers could come in and pick up fliers for events around town, and hear new music –local or otherwise- recommended by a staff that prided itself on its breadth of musical knowledge. The record store did well enough in its first years to move to 1534 Bardstown Road, a prime location in Louisville's trendy Highlands neighborhood, and an address formerly occupied by a Pier One[3] (Bickers). It would be tempting, looking back, to see the 1995 move as the first step in what became a hard-fought campaign to maintain Louisville's local businesses against the spread of chains.

Battle lines were officially drawn in 2003, when the first billboard appeared. This was a particularly alarming year for the area's local businesses. In the previous decade, Meijer had opened stores in Louisville, which further reduced the flagging Winn-Dixie groceries and threatened even strong chains like Kroger, to say nothing of the threat it posed to local businesses. 2003, however, saw the arrival of Wild Oats and Whole Foods, which impacted even those local grocers like Rainbow Blossom, who had held on to their customer base for three decades through the promotion of specializations not covered by the grocery chains, like natural foods, and preventative and alternative medicines. More ominous, perhaps, was the decision made by Hawley-Cooke bookstore to admit defeat and sell their stores to Borders[4] ("Keeping Louisville Weird"). The death of the beloved bookstore alarmed other local entrepreneurs, including Timmons. Realizing that many Louisvillians hadn't even known the bookstore was struggling, he decided to raise awareness about the plight of local businesses. Inspired by a trip to Austin and its Keep Austin Weird campaign, Timmons began with a billboard that simply read "Keep Louisville Weird," but soon the words began to appear on the sides of buses, t-shirts, and

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[3] Since ear X-tacy's close, Panera Bread has taken up residence, in spite of strong support by media and residents for the owner to lease the site to another local business.

[4] Borders, of course, has since closed all the stores they purchased from the much-missed Hawley-Cooke, leaving Louisville with only a few Barnes and Noble and Half-Price Books locations to supplement the independent retailers still hanging on.

bumper stickers ("Keeping"). Within a few years, as more people discovered where the slogan came from and what it stood for, it became the rallying cry not just of Timmons but of other local businesses, many of which came together to form the Louisville Independent Business Alliance (LIBA).

Unfortunately, ear X-tacy itself is no longer among their ranks. In spite of a small but fiercely loyal fan-base, the store suffered financially and moved south from its prime Highlands location to the Douglass Loop in 2010, and struggled on for another year before closing in October of 2011. Even if it has had to do so without its founding member, though, LIBA seems to be going strong. Today the Alliance boasts over 500 members, and their most recent (2013) "Summer/Fall Guide," a phonebook of local businesses that includes ads and coupons, is a 39-page directory with entries ranging across entertainment, retail, services, food, and even a listing of non-local businesses they consider "supporters" dedicated to helping them keep Louisville weird.

FROM SITUATION TO ECOLOGY

It hasn't always been clear, though, looking at the movement, what it means to be "weird," and how we go about preserving that "weirdness." Many conclude, as the LIBA seems to, that weirdness means a variety of local stores, and we preserve it by shopping at them. To assume this, I argue, means positioning the movement in a very narrow definition of the rhetorical situation, unconsciously echoing the formulaic rules of rhetoric laid out by Lloyd Bitzer. In his 1968 article, Bitzer defines rhetoric as "pragmatic," saying rhetoric comes into being "for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task" (302). So far, so good. The catch is that rhetoric must perform a specific task, one tied intimately to the exigence which prompts the rhetoric to

begin with. (Like being Weird, rhetoric has only one job here.) For Bitzer, an exigence(the flaw or sense of urgency) is only rhetorical if it can be altered by discourse –in those cases where the rhetor is unable to determine beforehand whether or not discourse will be effective, he must proceed as if the exigence is rhetorical and hope for the best. The example Bitzer gives to illustrate the dilemma faced by the uncertain rhetor is that of a lawyer trying to decide whether to make an appeal on behalf of a client (305). Although this is clearly an exigence for counsel and client, the lawyer may not be able to tell if it is a rhetorical one, and thus whether making an appeal will have any effect. Because it is theoretically possible for the situation to be altered by discourse however, the Bitzerian lawyer would make the appeal, discovering by his failure or success whether or not the exigence was rhetorical.

For the student (or user) of rhetoric, there are causes for concern here. First, Bitzer's theory relies on both an identifiable exigence, even if only after the fact, and requires the rhetor to seek a particular outcome which functions both to prove the success of the rhetor and prove the exigence rhetorical after the fact. When the desired outcome is not achieved, it means one of two things: the rhetor has "missed the mark," and failed to provide the fitting response to a rhetorical exigence, or the rhetor has misinterpreted the exigence, seeing it as rhetorical when in fact it was not (307). But more importantly, this model of the rhetorical situation denies the possibility that rhetoric that "fails" to secure the favorable outcome may still *be* rhetoric, and may still have effects, even if they are far-reaching and unpredictable.

Bitzer's approach to rhetoric has been well-explored by others[5], and my goal here is neither to defend nor revise him, but I am interested in the way his formulaic interpretation of the rhetorical situation manifests in discussion of the Keep Louisville Weird campaign. In an

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[5] Scholarship by Richard Vatz, Craig Smith and Scott Lybarger, and Barbara Biesecker directly respond to and build on Bitzer's work, for example.

announcement/analysis of a 2008 book-signing event entitled "Why Buy Local," Rick Redding, a contributor to the online newspaper The 'Ville Voice, both encouraged and criticized the Keep Louisville Weird movement. The campaign, he noted, has "a really cool tag line," but ultimately "include[s] a lot more talk than action" (Redding). This argument implies that Keep Louisville Weird, while an interesting piece of rhetoric on its own, does not meet the exigence its rhetor (presumably Timmons or the LIBA) is responding to. Keep Louisville Weird is (or should be) a man on a mission, loosed in the world with the sole purpose of encouraging local sales. With this in mind, Redding's article proposes suggestions for maximizing the effectiveness of the movement, something the author feels Keep Louisville Weird currently fails to do.

This critique relies on the Bitzerian model of the rhetorical situation, which assumes that if Keep Louisville Weird "fails" to perform the specific task assigned to it, it achieves nothing. Comments about the online article both agreed with and disputed the author's position, producing statistics about sales and advertisements. These comments agree with Redding's assessment of the purpose of the movement's rhetoric, even if they dispute his claims about the effects. In essence, these comments are engaged in a conversation about whether or not the movement has responded adequately to a rhetorical exigence.

Most interesting to me, however, are two other comments, one of which asks "Why is keeping Louisville weird a 100% commerce based activity?" Another left later that same day adds, "Keeping Louisville weird is far more than a commercial activity… it's a cultural activity" (Redding). These comments examine Keep Louisville Weird not as if it were an object with clearly defined borders, sent into the world to perform a specific task, but as something harder to pin down. This view of rhetoric is much closer to Rice's interpretation of the rhetorical situation

as "a framework of *affective ecologies*," wherein all elements are interconnected in affective relationships, and can have far-reaching and unpredictable effects (9).

Under a Bitzerian model, rhetoric which doesn't fit the situation simply misses the mark, it goes nowhere. In an ecological model, the stakes are much higher. To open up the rhetorical situation in this way means that the question is not what supporters of Keep Louisville Weird – whether that means Timmons, local businesses, or individual shoppers- **intend** it to do, but rather what it actually does. Rice's work on Keep Austin Weird examines the way this slogan, set loose in the world, not only impacts the sales and situation of local businesses, but performs other work as well. Rice reports that "The phrase "Keep Austin Weird" quickly passed into the city's cultural circulation, taking on the importance of a quasi-civic duty" (16).The phrase comes to stand for a call to maintain a desirable state against undesirable changes, to exercise the responsibility Austin residents felt to their hometown. In entering the city's "cultural circulation," the phrase gets adapted to other institutions/situations Austin residents hope to preserve. The impact of Keep Austin Weird is felt not just at more and more local businesses, but at The University of Texas, a local library, and a Cingular advertisement.

Keep Austin Weird is also felt in Louisville, as one of the cities to adopt its battle cry. The work being done by Keep Austin Weird (and thus by Keep Louisville Weird) goes far beyond the simple success or failure of an isolated piece of rhetoric, intended to have only one effect in only one situation. The criticisms in "Why Buy Local" may not acknowledge this work, but the comments defending Keep Louisville Weird not only refuse to treat it as "already-formed" and "already-discrete," they demonstrate some of the unpredictable effects of rhetoric in the way they talk about the movement itself. Neither comment speaks of Keep Louisville Weird

as a slogan or a proper name; instead both write about *keeping* Louisville weird, an action performed by members of a shared culture.

Opening up the situation in this way not only allows the movement to have wider effects, but it causes a shift in how we view the participants themselves. Redding's interpretation limits Keep Louisville Weird's audience by defining them as consumers who hear the message and either do or do not shop at local businesses in response. To examine Keep Louisville Weird as part of an ecology allows us to consider movement affiliation, as the discussions above indicate, as a cultural or civic activity, and to see how it functions to help residents both identify themselves as Louisvillian and to respond with others to the public problems that attend development and consumption.

A STICKY ~~SITUATION~~ ECOLOGY

In this section I want to flesh out the connection between buying local and civic duty that occurs in Louisville as a result of the movement. This connection between weirdness and citizenship happened largely through association, as Keep Louisville Weird found itself thrown up against and amidst other signs of Louisville culture circulating in the rhetorical ecology. As this happens, the signs stick to one another, creating new associations and connections.

In particular, Keep Louisville Weird was associated, almost from its origin, with a genuinely "weird" trend from the decades preceding the movement. This trend involves ear X-tacy bumper stickers, which Louisvillian cars first began to sport in 1986. The stickers were the result, Timmons says, of an order he placed to get rid of a stubborn salesperson, and featured only the store's logo, the words "ear X-tacy" in white on a black background, in a typewriter font (Bickers). As the store's popularity grew, more stickers showed up, both inside the city and

elsewhere. Timmons reports proudly that his stickers have been spotted as far away as Havana, Cuba (Bickers).

Ear X-tacy stickers also became part of what I called a genuinely weird trend. Soon after theybegan appearing on cars, there were variations. Someone at the store noticed the words "aXeyr cat" on a car bumper, in the familiar clunky font (Nold 117). The original sticker had been carefully cut into strips, which were rearranged to form a new sticker with a new message. But whether this was the first and the rest sprouted in its wake, or if this was only the first to be recognized, no one seems to know for sure. No matter which, once noticed, the variations seemed to be everywhere. Some of them appeared to be in conversation with the cryptic command cited above: "reX ate yr cat" (instead of or after it was aXed is uncertain), and "attack yreX" (once you've taken care of the cat) (Nold 117). Other permutations included "racer-X," "create art" (Bickers), "taX year," "da red taXi," "triX or treat," and "redundancy" (Nold 117). Slogans like these graced not only car bumpers, but also guitar cases, binders, and other flat surfaces. The stickers achieved widespread recognition when they made it into the 1997 *Insiders' Guide to Louisville, Kentucky and Southern Indiana*, which records two of my favorite remixes: the words "eXtra starch" on the back of a laundry truck, and the name of a competing Louisville record store, "better days" (Nold 117).

The intended purpose of the messages varied –from the obvious and ironic rivalry of "better days" to the (presumably) playful violence of "aXeyr cat," and the performative challenge both issued and executed by "create art"- but what all the variations have in common is the fact that they invoke both ear X-tacy or Louisville yet never directly reference either one. Like the use of "weird" in the Cingular advertisement Rice describes, the stickers drag with them a host of associations as they circulate.

In her book, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Sara Ahmed describes this association as "stickiness," a concept particularly appropriate when discussing bumper stickers. As Ahmed explains, signs can become sticky through repetition, or by encountering other sticky signs, either of which increases the overall affective value of the sign. Ahmed compares an object or sign which "gets repeated and accumulates affective value" to a "sticky finger" (90). That this term brings to mind thoughts of "sticky-fingered" thieves or children is appropriate; these images are useful for visualizing what Ahmed means. Sticky things get stuck to other things, or at least leave a sticky residue behind. Ahmed gives the example of disgust, specifically disgust and the circulation of hate-speech; when the language of disgust is applied to people or ideas, it eventually sticks –bringing with it the anger or fear that tends to get stuck to hateful language. Terms which refer to marginalized groups become insults by their "association with other signs, other forms of derision," but once this association is repeated often enough, the terms themselves become sticky, and the association between the terms and the derisive language –itself sticky- no longer needs to be made (92). Common metaphors like "dragging his name through the mud" suggest this transformation; after enough time, the mud sticks. When a sticky sign is used, it both carries with it the fingerprints of the sticky things that have touched it and gets its prints on everything new it brushes up against.

Stickiness is about the history of an object, and "what objects do to other objects," how they brush up against and collide with one another as they circulate, acquiring this affective value (91). Much as a coin becomes more tarnished (and sometimes literally sticky) only if it's in circulation, signs only become sticky if they are repeated, and repeated in the same or similar ways. Signs are not themselves intrinsically associated with positive or negative emotions, but "[If] a word is used in a certain way," Ahmed says "again and again, then that 'use' becomes

intrinsic" (91). This effect can be limiting, when negative emotions stick and the object or sign is unable to shed them and acquire new value (witness the lingering effects of hate-speech, for example), but it can also be useful for binding diverse signs (and their affective values) together. In this case, *Louisville* sticks to "ear X-tacy" for the person who spotted the sticker in Cuba in the same way that *ear X-tacy* (and *Louisville*) are stuck to "aXeyr cat" and its fellows for anyone who recognizes the font used in these playful variations. The remixed stickers become an inside joke, a statement about belonging to a place that allows others from the same place to recognize us.

When the Keep Louisville Weird movement first entered the ecology, it was impossible for *ear X-tacy* not to adhere to it, given the form it took. The original artifacts of the movement weren't signed by Timmons, but most of the people who saw them realized immediately that they had some connection to ear X-tacy, myself included. Although adapted from the Keep Austin Weird campaign discussed in Rice's article, there are several differences between the visual presentation of the two. The original Austin stickers appear to have featured the logos of two local businesses on either side of the words Keep Austin Weird, with "support local businesses" in smaller letters underneath (Rice 16). Variations built on this, featuring the logos of other businesses in combination with the Keep Austin Weird font and style. In contrast, when Timmons began the Louisville campaign, and Keep Louisville Weird began to appear on bumpers, it was only those three words, minus the accompanying text –defining "weird" as "local"- and without store slogans. In fact, because Timmons used the same color scheme and font that appear on his store logo, ear X-tacy was the only local business referenced by the movement. Keep Louisvile Weird thus initially as no different than"aXeyr cat" –more coherent, perhaps, slightly less ambiguous, but dragging all the baggage of ear X-tacy in its wake. And as

the phrase Keep Louisville Weird repeated, and showed up in more and more places, it didn't loosen its hold on ear X-tacy, but stuck to, and got stuck in with, other signs of Louisvillian identity.

WEIRD CITIZENS

The rhetoric of Keep Louisville Weird constructs the Louisvillian citizen as an identity in danger of being lost; a Louisville which exists as weird and is in the process of becoming less weird is at risk of becoming not only not-weird, but not-Louisville. The movement asks its audience members to construct themselves as having a stake in maintaining the distinction between weird and not-weird, or Louisville and not-Louisville. The slogan thus announces not just consumer loyalty, but becomes, as the commenter on The 'Ville Voice argues, a "cultural activity."

Unsurprisingly, since the relative success of Keep Louisville Weird and a national turn toward the local, Louisville has seen many more expressions of hometown pride, which often manifests (also unsurprisingly) as support for local businesses. Local news stations and the most widely read paper, *The Courier-Journal*, cover events such as the "Indie Day," hosted by ear X-tacy in 2007, a festival which combined the promotion of independent musicians in general with local food, beverages, and wares. The yearly St. James Art Fair has become more oriented around the same businesses whose names appear again and again in connection with Keep Louisville Weird. As mentioned above, LIBA publishes and distributes a sizable guide to shopping locally, with over a hundred businesses represented, offering a variety of goods and services. During the most recent holiday seasons, the Association members hosted fairs and introduced a "passport" that shoppers could get stamped at participating stores. Those with enough stamps were eligible to win prizes donated by "weird" businesses.

More interesting, however, are unexpected examples of how keeping Louisville weird has become, in Rice's words, a "quasi-civic duty," as it gets bound up with language and symbols connected to citizenship. Urging the city to support a particular renovation plan that would revitalize the Whiskey Row area without removing Louisvlle's cast-iron building fronts, *The Courier-Journal* reminds readers that, nationally, only New York City boasts more of these fixtures and argues that "without doubt, these historic fronts need to be preserved to maintain the city's unique character –or to "keep Lousiville Weird," as local businesses put it" ("Making history"). In his race against Anne Northup, Councilman John Yarmuth, better known locally before he took his seat as the founder of *LEO Magazine* (*Louisville's Eccentric Observer*) reminded Louisvillians not only of his own status as a local businessman, but of his long-time support for other local businesses and community projects. ear X-tacy owner Timmons let Yarmuth hold a "Keep Louisville Yarmuth" rally at his record store, and many of the same cars sporting Weird stickers added Yarmuth's remix alongside.

Symbols promoting Louisvillian citizenship are also more common. The fleur-de-lis motif which appears on all official Louisville seals is hardly a new design; the city gets its name from King Louis XVI. Variations on this stylized flower have long appeared singly or in groups on public works vehicles, street signs, police cars, and many trash bins. To say that parts of the city have always "worn" Louisville on its body would not be much of a stretch. More recently, an increasing number of local businesses incorporate the fleur-de-lis into their signs, often businesses affiliated with Keep Louisville Weird and the LIBA (which itself sports a fleur-de-lis in its logo), becoming not just independently owned businesses but Louisvillian independently owned businesses. The citizens who support them, in affixing sticky signs like Keep Louisville Weird bumper stickers to their cars, or by purchasing t-shirts from ear X-tacy, Heine Brothers

Coffee, or the Bluegrass Brewing Company wear citizenship on their cars or bodies. Still others brand the city into their skin; fleur-de-lis tattoos, thin on the ground before the movement, are now a very common choice for those who want to display their identification with Louisville.

The variety of citizenship being offered here functions in multiple registers, and has potential impact both inside of and outside of the institutions of citizenship. It influences daily individual choices about where to buy coffee, which bank to use, or what tattoo to get, but in operating on a cultural level it also raises questions about topics such as what our cities should look like, what the responsibilities of consumers and retailers are to one another, and what the responsibilities of both are to the communities they are embedded in. These topics, while certainly political, are not normally susceptible to the influence of citizens, who often receive little official voice in choosing the businesses around them. In arguing that we vote with our dollars, buy-local movements allow for greater participation from citizens, and in brushing up against one another, Keep Louisville Weird and Yarmuth's campaign encourages them to bring extra-institutional practices to bear on elections, to participate in both.

CONCLUSIONS

I have argued that examining the movement as part of an ecology allows its impact on citizenship in Louisville to come forward, by challenging us to think outside of restrictive notions of the rhetorical situation at the often unforeseen and unintended effects of rhetoric. It's unlikely that John Timmons (to the extent that we can pinpoint an actor here) imagined that he would (literally) change what being from Louisville looks like. As I conclude, though, I want to consider some of the other possible (and less positive) material effects of buy local rhetoric: local-washing and gentrification. Rice finds it ironic that a big-name like Cingular takes up "weird" in Austin, incorporating it into their advertisements, but today this sort of "local-

washing" has become so common that we no longer blink at it. Given the popularity of buying local, the word "local" (like "weird" in Louisville) carries with it positive affective value, and entities we might not normally think of as local have rushed to make use of that value. Bookstores include small sections on local interests and grocery chains make a point of displaying a token selection of local items. Companies like Starbucks or Meijer remind shoppers in Washington and Michigan that these states are their "home" even if they've spread across the nation (or globe).

The practice of local-washing (strangely enough, given the term) reveals the difficulty of determining what it means to be local. Is Starbucks local if you're in Seattle, if nowhere else? Is Heine Bros (a coffeeshop indigenous to Louisville that's grown to about a dozen stores in the last 15 years) still small enough to be local? When are you too big to be weird? Keeping Louisville weird obscures the question of what the term means –because Louisville is constructed by its very phrasing as already in this state. All that can be inferred is that Louisville as it exists now is weird, and this weird is desirable. One irony of the movement is that the visual origin of the slogan, as I discussed earlier, grows out of –and eventually replaces- a Louisvillian trend which was distinctly weird. Because Keep Louisville Weird gets stuck to ear X-tacy, we can safely assume that the record store is weird, and by extension, those businesses affiliated with the LIBA alongside it. Beyond that, weird gets harder to pin down. Those businesses are local, but there are many local businesses whose owners choose not to be affiliated with either the LIBA or Keep Louisville Weird.

The obscurity of "weird" gives rise to my concerns about gentrification. In recent years, the LIBA has begun a campaign to bring the movement to South Louisville, to neighborhoods not heavily marked by the visible signs of citizen performance so prolific in the Highlands and

Crescent Hill, predominantly white, middle-class neighborhoods. A survey of over 500 south Louisville residents reported that they are interested in seeing more local businesses, in particular more restaurants, bookstores, and entertainment venues. While local businesses are thinner on the ground in neighborhoods like Shively, where cheap fast food and retail options abound, such businesses do exist. Nonetheless, the LIBA reports that "The top specific requests were Heine Brothers' Coffee, Bluegrass Brewing Company, Rainbow Blossom, Homemade Ice Cream & Pie Kitchen and Carmichael's" (Boyd). All are prominent LIBA members, of course. Their infiltration into south Louisville could threaten existing local businesses, whose names are not so well known and who do not benefit from the positive feelings associated with Keep Louisville Weird affiliates. Here "keeping" south Louisville weird runs the risk of making it the same weird that exists on Bardstown Road, rather than seeking out and maintaining the cultures of these neighborhoods. In these examples, the language of these movements is taken up by those (perhaps including the LIBA) who would move buying local away from the cultural or civic and closer to the register of consumerism.

My point, though, is not to denounce the practices of businesses which have an understandable interest in remaining competitive, but to point out that seeing the civic dimension of buying local (and consequently, the possible civic dimension of choosing not to buy locally) allows us to grapple with public issues that are lost when where we shop is simply a matter of individual preference.

Chapter 3 Co-operative Competition and the "Battle in Seattle"

In the last chapter, I focused on what could be called the smallest of my examples of extra-institutional citizenship. It is small geographically, inasmuch as the rhetoric of Keep Louisville Weird suggests to those it touches that both problems and their solution are already present, and the movement is largely unconcerned with the fate of other towns. While it might prompt us to develop an approach to consumption that can be applied to any city we might visit or move to, it is most concerned with the condition of a single city. But it is also small in terms of conflict, because our disinclination to regard acts of consumption as civic engagement means that participants are under no obligation to interact with those who disagree with them. They are more likely to be dismissed than attacked.

This chapter zooms out, both in scope and in potential for conflict, to look at an example of protest - specifically the 1999 demonstrations against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, WA. I vividly remember the "Battle in Seattle". The year before, I'd spent my spring break in the city, falling in love with the damp air, vibrant neighborhoods, and hazy skies. I knew ahead of time, from the news and from acquaintances in the city that a massive, peaceful protest was in the works, and I listened horrified as the stories trickled in of fires in the street, residents harassed by police and spreading clouds of tear gas, and unresisting protestors brutally attacked with batons, pepper spray, and rubber bullets. I'd seen small protests before, but Seattle was eye-opening, both because of its size and because of the city's reaction.

Although I knew vaguely that the demonstrations, and thus the violence, had something to do with the World Trade Organization, I understood very little about what it was or why anyone would be for or against it. At the time then, I was firmly on the side of the demonstrators without fully understanding why.   Today, although I still share many of the concerns,

complaints, and goals of the men and women who took to the streets, the question of Seattle no longer seems one of sides. Fifteen years ago, I was indignant at hearing demonstrators referred to by the media and my own relatives as thugs, idiots, whining children, criminals (the same charges I would later be indignant about as a participant in the Detroit branch of Occupy Wall Street), but my anger stemmed from my convictions about the rightness of all the protests stood for. Today, my response to a narrative that paints WTO demonstrators as dupes or criminals is to wonder why we are so quick to dismiss conflict as either ignorance or lawlessness, why we are so unwilling to hear dissenting voices. Why, amid concerns about low voter turnout and politically apathetic young people, are we made uncomfortable by what seem like expressions of passionate civic engagement?

As my comparison to Occupy suggests, the events of Seattle are still relevant today. Protests like these are immediately identifiable as political, which would seem to make it easy to regard protesters as citizens. In reality, however, I will argue in this chapter that what it means to be an engaged citizen is still unclear, and those who take to the streets to exercise their civic responsibilities are still likely to find themselves in the midst of a question about sides, calling themselves heroes while the opposition labels them criminals.

After a brief overview of the history of the WTO, and the grievances that led to the protests, I will discuss the competing narratives about "what happened" in Seattle. While protesters insist that they dealt a crippling blow to the WTO, critics insist that the demonstrations were nothing more than an embarrassing (and expensive) inconvenience. Following this, I will zoom in on one of the most widely recognized representations of the demonstrations, Stuart Townsend's *Battle in Seattle*. Although the film champions the protestors, it does so by taking up the rhetoric of warfare, painting the conflict as a battle and the protestors as victorious soldiers.

In both personal accounts and the film, opposing parties, and their competing narratives, remain antagonistic, with the result that it becomes difficult to talk about the demonstrations as acts of citizenship.

The position I will take is not that such conflict needs to be eliminated - rather it is that we need to more productively allow for conflict in performances of citizenship. In "Rhetoric – Old and New," Kenneth Burke references the "co-operative competition" between multiple rhetoricians that "can lead to views transcending the limitations of each" (203). I draw on Burke because cooperative competition suggests a means of managing conflict that doesn't rely on the suppression of lesser voices by a dominant voice, or on belief in an (often imaginary) middle ground of compromise where everyone is appeased. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, though, while there is ample conflict between protestors and their critics, and within the ranks of the demonstrators themselves, very little of it is cooperative or leads to transformation. Instead, the conflict becomes absorbed in the language of war and citizenship is pushed to the side.

OVERVIEW

The origins of the World Trade Organization date back to the Second World War. After World War II, the United States and other developed countries gathered at the Bretton Woods Conference to establish agreements on economic issues. Regarding tariffs and other trade barriers as contributing factors in the Depression and the acts of aggression following it, these nations sought to eliminate them in an effort to raise the economic well-being of all countries (Fergusson). Economic prosperity, they felt, would lead to peace. With this in mind, the Conference laid the groundwork for institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The GATT, formed in 1948, was

a provisional agreement which stood until the formation of the WTO, implemented January 1, 1995.

The WTO's sphere of influence has grown over the years, and is both wide and clearly marked. The GATT at first dealt only in measures such as tariffs, bans, and quotas, with other rules, such as those regarding subsidies, coming later. During the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), questions of intellectual property were added to the GATT's sphere and inherited by the WTO, with the result that today "Trade agreements administered by the WTO cover a broad range of goods and services trade and apply to virtually all government practices that directly relate to trade, for example tariffs, subsidies, government procurement, and trade-related intellectual property rights" (Fergusson). Many, demonstrators in Seattle among them, want(ed) the WTO to add questions of labor and the environment to their agendas. Calling these "nontraditional topics," Ian Fergusson says in a 2011 report for Congress that "U.S. businesses generally want the WTO to refrain from extending beyond … traditionally trade-related issues, because they argue that the greatest export opportunities will be achieved only if negotiators focus on trade barriers and do not include social factors." This position seems unproductive to some, who argue that our economic conditions influence our social lives, and thus social factors should have the opportunity to "talk back" to economic concerns. As it stands though, while the WTO (today, perhaps in response to events in Seattle) cites protecting the environment as a concern, other social issues are outside their sphere.

The WTO's purpose, like the GATT's, is to supervise international trade, providing a forum where nations can meet and formalize agreements, as well as a court for member nations to bring grievances before. Members are expected to adhere to WTO agreements, and to abide by their rulings in any disputes that may arise, with the result that member nations retain their

autonomy but only at a price. Regarding the US's position as a sovereign nation, Fergusson's report notes that members make a commitment to the WTO, agreeing to be bound by its rules and rulings. While the WTO "cannot force members to adhere to their obligations" (Fergusson), members are aware that refusing these obligations may hinder their own efforts in future WTO negotiations. A nation can refuse to comply only at the risk of damaging its own future interests.

Although the WTO has a General Council which meets monthly, high-level decisions can only be made at a Ministerial Conference, one of which must be called every two years, if not more often. After its formation in 1995, the WTO held its first Ministerial Conference in December of 1996, in Singapore. The second, in May of 1998, was in Geneva. The third, known as the Millennium Round, destined to become better known as the site of the Battle in Seattle, was scheduled to begin in late November of 1999.

Resistance had been in the air for years before Seattle. Protests attended other meetings of the WTO, expressing concerns and outrage about the globalized world it represented. The Jubilee 2000 movement of the early 90s put pressure on politicians to pay attention to the plight of the world's most impoverished nations, conditions they felt were aggravated by WTO or IMF policies. Consumer groups, unions, other labor-rights groups, and environmentalists pushed back against financial deregulation, and similar groups began to call attention to companies entangled with sweatshop labor. Libertarians and other isolationist conservatives, alarmed at the number of jobs moving overseas, objected to the economic damage done by globalization, while liberal groups were concerned with labor conditions and environmental damage.

By 1999, then, the battle lines were already drawn by those firmly in favor of or firmly opposed to the WTO and similar bodies, leaving the vast majority in the middle increasingly unable to ignore the debate, and trying to decide which side they should take. Politicians like

President Clinton, hoping to win over or hold onto moderate voters while keeping the unruly alliance of libertarians and liberals in check or on his side, respectively, attempted to walk a tightrope between challenging and conforming to the WTO. In a characteristic example of the difficulties attendant upon navigating these waters, Clinton asked the WTO to be more open and to put labor rights on the agenda for Seattle, a move that attempted to make everyone happy and ultimately succeeded in making no one happy.

Recent rulings by the WTO, moreover, had already-skeptical citizens in many countries up in arms before the Seattle Ministerial was even scheduled. The WTO had recently ruled against Europe's ban on hormone-treated meat (largely supplied by the US), and against the US's refusal to do business with companies whose practices endangered species such as dolphins and sea turtles. These actions further inflamed and frightened WTO skeptics and opponents, either by showing a disregard for the environment and public health, or by seeming to deny the sovereignty of the nations concerned.

The WTO, for its part, did little to dispel such fears; even today they use language that makes it clear where their priorities lie. Their website claims that while their agreements are lengthy and complex, a few simple principles form the foundation of the group: non-discrimination, openness, predictability and transparency, improving competitiveness, benefitting less developed countries, and protecting the environment. On the surface, these sound admirable, but for the WTO openness means openness for trade, by way of eliminating barriers such as tariffs and import bans. Predictability and transparency likewise, are with respect to trade because they believe that "companies, investors and governments should be confident that trade barriers [will] not be raised arbitrarily" ("What we stand for"). Even the WTO's commitment to the environment is not their own, but rather a promise not to interfere with steps taken by

member nations to protect the environment or public health. Member nations are cautioned, moreover, not to use environmental protection "as a means of disguising protectionist policies." As they say themselves, branded at the bottom of every page on their site, the primary function of the WTO is "to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible."Although a reference is made to the lower prices and greater choice to be enjoyed by consumers, by and large the WTO exists to protect and smooth the way for companies, investors, and governments.

It's worth keeping in mind here that, as I said above, this is the language of today's WTO, one that has supposedly responded to Seattle (and other demonstrations) with more openness and greater sensitivity. The lukewarm focus on the environment, for example, is the legacy of events in Seattle. What this suggests, then, is that the WTO, seeks to function as a governing body, but not one that promotes or allows for citizenship at any level smaller than a unified nation or less influential than a corporation. That businesses would have pull when it comes to determining positions makes sense, given the WTO's goal of regulating trade. However, *The Nation* ran a piece in 1999 pointing out that "a coalition of corporations including Monsanto, DuPont, Merck and other giants" assisted the US in drafting their position on patents and copyrights during the GATT's Uruguay Round" (Borosage), suggesting that these corporations are all but members. While individual citizens have no voice at WTO meetings, CEOs often do.

It was this sense of being excluded from decisions that impacted their lives, of having their citizenship curtailed, that led demonstrators to gather in Seattle and move against what *The Art of Protest* calls "a drastically unbalanced world economy in which the two hundred richest corporations have twice the wealth of the pooled assets of 80 percent of the world's population,

and in which fifty of the one hundred wealthiest economies are not nations but corporations"
(Reed 240). Estimates vary, but between 40 and 60,000 people seem to have been involved in the
planning, execution, and aftermath of what became known as "The Battle in Seattle," "The
Battle of Seattle," or simply "Seattle." More than 700 organizations were represented, including
the Global Trade Watch, steelworkers, longshoremen, loggers, the Sierra Club, Earth First!, the
AFL-CIO, the Ruckus Society, the Rainforest Action Network, and others. Big names such as
Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, and Ralph Nader were in attendance.

This large and diverse guest list came with a similarly daunting set of (sometimes
competing) agendas. Among their demands, various groups included opposing China's
admission to the WTO, awarding member nations control over decisions about which goods to
include in domestic markets, and honoring the environmental and public health standards of
individual nations. Concerns were aired about the environment and workers' rights, but also
about the future of small farmers, the burden of debt on developing nations, and the rights of
women, students, and consumers worldwide.

In some cases, surprising coalitions formed, as these groups discovered common ground
and worked through their differences. As the *LA Times* put it, Seattle showed us "Hard hats and
longshoremen standing with granola crunchers and tree huggers, bus drivers and carpenters with
snake dancers and organic food activists". Playing off of the sight of union workers marching
alongside demonstrators decked out in sea turtle costumes, at least one sign rejoiced, "Teamsters
and Turtles Together at Last".

But not all differences could be reconciled, and not every group hoped for the same
outcome from the demonstrations. Some wanted to reform the WTO, IMF, and World Bank into
ethical governing bodies, while others wanted some or all of these institutions abolished

completely. Of those who wanted an end to the WTO, some called for a new, more democratic globalization, while others wanted smaller, more locally-focused governments and economic systems. The one thing they all wanted was to shut down the Millennium round of talks, and make their own voices heard.

As I mentioned in the last chapter, how we think of the rhetorical situation matters here. Because both supporters and detractors of the demonstrators accept a narrow definition of the situation, they find themselves bound by it. The demonstrations become an assemblage of rhetorics, sent out with a single goal: shut it down. The protestors have no choice but to insist that they changed the world, and critics like Friedman have no choice but to argue that events would have played out just the same without them. N30 veterans point to the breakdown in the talks and say "we did that," while critics point out the flaws in this argument. Did they or didn't they shut down the WTO in 1999? This seems to be the question that consumes both sides.

The point here is not to answer that question, but to ask what the difficulty we have in answering it means about the significance of these events. It can't be as easy as saying that "Seattle" equals all of the testimonies, opinions, experiences, and images of that day, thus allowing us to wash our hands of it. Whether what happened was "protestors shut down the WTO" or not, *something* happened. What, though, is a difficult question to answer. As the title of Rebecca and David Solnit's account, *The Battle of the Story of the Battle of Seattle*, suggests, the conflict on N30 was as much about language as anything else. In my research, I have heard the same event called the Battle of, in, and for Seattle – and each variation lends a slightly different nature to the encounter. Was the battle in this city, or for this city? Why call it a battle, and not something else? I have struggled with my own terms while writing this. If not a battle, are the events of that week a riot? Or a protest? Or a demonstration? To call the participants

protestors seems potentially unsympathetic (although I do at times). To call them demonstrators seems more neutral, and so I have probably leaned more heavily on that term. But if this is a demonstration, and these are demonstrators – a demonstration of what? Everyone involved (myself not excluded) is locked into a war of words.

"5 DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD"

Although the events of what came to be called N30 (for November 30th, the opening day of the talks) are well documented, the chaos of that week makes a partial account well worth assembling here. Fixing a timeline is complicated because court cases involving demonstrators were not fully settled until 2007, so any ending to the demonstrations is artificial. If the extended legal battles make a end-point difficult to establish it's similarly difficult to pinpoint the moment events in Seattle begin. Does it start when Seattle was chosen for the site? Or when the first emails and bulletin board messages went out, proposing ideas for the demonstrations? Even setting the date to coincide with the arrival of protestors in the city is messy. Demonstrators had been massing for some time before N30, holding meetings and festivities both for themselves and the public, but they, like the WTO, seem to have regarded the evening of the 29th as the opening reception. I have chosen to end with December 3rd, even though the events set in motion that week drag on for years after, because it is the end point for the WTO talks. As protestors gather around the police station to agitate for the release of their arrested colleagues, the fight against the WTO starts to give way to a fight against the city. For the purposes of this document, then, I will focus on Monday the 29th of November through Friday, December 3rd – what Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair's book calls "5 days that shook the world."

Monday – N29: The day before WTO talks opened. Various groups involved in the protest held teach-ins (as they had been for some days) about issues related to the WTO and

globalization. Farmer and activist Jose Bove stationed himself at a McDonalds at 3rd and Pine, handing out samples of Roquefort cheese smuggled in tariff-free . Seduced by his words (or his cheese) the crowd, including customers, got slightly out of hand and a window was broken, although not by Bove (Thomas 28). The evening brought music and dancing, a film showing, and an interfaith service. In spite of the rain, several thousand people (largely Jubilee 2000 participants) gathered around the Exhibition Center to sing and pray for debt relief in developing countries, as WTO delegates met inside for their opening reception. While some tension did exist, all in all, the protestors were exuberant, police were indulgent, and citizens were tolerant.

Tuesday – N30: On Tuesday, though, the atmosphere changed. Protestors knew they were required to abide by a "no-protest" zone close to the site of the talks, but they nonetheless successfully prevented many delegates from ever reaching the safety of that zone. Relying on Seattle's cramped streets, they had long since planned to block off every intersection approaching the no-protest zone. WTO participants who overcame the resulting traffic were prevented from attending the talks by human chains blocking the access of both vehicles and pedestrians.

The demonstrators who made up the human chains had agreed ahead of time to risk arrest, and were composed mostly of students. Assembling in the intersections, they secured themselves together with chains, tape, wires, PVC pipes, and other materials, making it impossible for police to move them without either dismantling everything or injuring the members of the chain. Cautioned to let no one in, but to offer no resistance or violence, many protestors report waiting passively, even as delegates shoved at them and yelled. Jeffrey St. Clair recalls one delegate pulling a gun on them, although nothing came of it (24).

If delegates were shoving though, of course some protestors were shoving back. And refusing to fight didn't mean refusing to yell at WTO participants that they weren't working today, or that no one wanted them in Seattle. Although some delegates (particularly those from Europe, where the labor movement is stronger) shrugged this behavior off, others felt angry, intimidated by demonstrators, or disgusted with Seattle officials for not preventing these displays.

Meanwhile, opening ceremonies were scheduled to begin, but only a few participants had been able to get to them. Under pressure by organizers and the mayor to get the delegates into the talks, the police moved against protestors. The Seattle Fire Department had already refused to turn their hoses on the protestors, so police relied on tear gas and pepper spray. Participants interviewed by Janet Thomas report seeing police tear the protective bandanas from faces, or pulling up demonstrators that had curled into defensive balls so that they could spray their faces directly with the pepper spray (Thomas 87). Those in the chains, many without the use of their arms, obviously suffered the most, unable to escape or defend themselves against the rubber bullets or tear gas aimed at them. In spite of this, the gas failed as a dispersal technique. Those who could move either scattered, only to regroup when the smoke cleared, or stayed to try and aid their immobile colleagues. Opening ceremonies were canceled, and those delegates that hadn't already ventured out were told to stay in their hotel rooms.

The first store windows were smashed around noon, after police had already clashed with demonstrators. Reports vary as to the number of participants involved in the vandalism, although both sides agree that the number was very small in comparison to the total number of protestors. Some witnesses claim the vandals were a small group, perhaps 20, while others suggest there may have been as many as 200. These black-clad protestors have been connected to the Black

Bloc, one of the groups affiliated with the demonstrations. Armed with hammers or other blunt weapons, their window-smashing was aimed at well-known chains and big-box stores. Local businesses, it seems, were largely left alone. Moreover, some protestors seem to have tried to halt the vandalism, urging them to embrace non-violence[6] and attempting to protect the store windows. Nonetheless, shoppers were alarmed, and storeowners closed early, or boarded-up their windows to protect them. Organizers had feared that violence (to humans or property) would distract from their message, and their concerns proved well-founded as media coverage centered on clouds of gas and shattering windows. In many ways, for those watching the demonstrations on the news, these windows would come to characterize the Battle in Seattle, and those who participated in it.

While protestors and police clashed in the streets, a planned march by the AFL-CIO was wrapping up. Originally, union members had agreed to join the rest of the demonstrations after their march, but a last minute offer to allow union reps a seat at the WTO table in return for abandoning the protests changed all that. Organizers led marchers away from the original route, and down a new one, away from the site of the WTO, the other protestors, and their struggles with the police. Many AFL-CIO members obeyed, but others were confused or angered by the change of plans and deviated from the new route to meet up with their allies as planned. Their numbers swelled the ranks of the demonstrators significantly, although not as much as the "civilian" protestors might have hoped.

By the end of the day, city and state officials had declared a state of emergency, and imposed a 7pm curfew. Some protestors had been arrested (about 70), but many more had endured pepper spray, tear gas, rubber bullets, concussion grenades, or blows from the batons of

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[6] Some Black Bloc members (by no means a homogenous group itself) insisted at the time (and some continue to insist) that destruction of corporate property should not be labeled "violence" (ACME Collective).

police in riot gear. Some protestors were caught, gassed, and released, perhaps to be gassed again later. The news showed two images over and over: officers in Robocop-style black armor, and breaking windows.

Wednesday – D1: Downtown Seattle was declared a no-protest zone, expanding the original boundaries, and the city temporarily rendered purchasing or carrying a gas mask illegal. Many expressed outrage over these attacks on civil rights, and even President Clinton publicly said that some protestors should be allowed to observe the talks. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these measures failed to keep demonstrators out of the streets, and this time neither they nor the police had as much patience.

The second official day of protest wasn't messier than the first, but certainly something had changed. The previous day had established a precedent for violence which the second day both met and exceeded. Police went so far as to chase some protestors into the near-by Capitol Hill neighborhood, although it was outside of the no-protest zone. Residents of the neighborhood were gassed for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, or because it was impossible to tell who was a protestor and who wasn't. Some residents fled, and others joined in the protest out of anger at the invasion of their neighborhood. Perhaps reacting to criticism over their ineffectiveness on Tuesday, police arrested some 500 people.

Meanwhile, the President's much-anticipated visit fell flat, where it didn't do actual harm. Concessions he'd promised to the world's poorest nations weren't delivered, and his insistence on the necessity of including labor standards in WTO deals angered and alarmed developing nations, who saw this as pandering to union "bullying". Union members demonstrating in the streets, meanwhile, were unimpressed with his half-measures.

Thursday – D2 : By this point, both police and protestors were exhausted, but still in the streets. Inside the talks, harassed and tear-gassed delegates vented their own frustrations, especially in light of Clinton's short and disappointing visit. The willingness of participants to work together suffered noticeably, and *The Guardian* reports that US trade representative Barshefsky was mocked when she attempted to open a morning session. Similarly, a US attempt to call an unscheduled session on labor standards fell apart when Pakistan declared it illegal and threatened to sabotage talks in every working group. Other countries responded in kind, and a number of African delegates protested their exclusion from an agricultural deal being worked out between the US and EU. The scene inside the talks began to resemble the scene outside.

Friday – D3: Demonstrators and Seattlites gathered to protest the arrests, calling for officials to "Free the Seattle 600." The talks, such as they were, wound down at the WTO, with nothing resolved.

SEATTLE'S LEGACY

As mentioned above, Cockburn and St. Clair call these events "5 days that shook the world." But who did the shaking, exactly? And what was left when the dust settled? What was accomplished during these five days seems to depend on who you ask. While the talks reportedly "fell apart," and supporters claim this was due to the demonstrations, others insist the two are only loosely related, if at all. Janet Thomas says, "It was a parade and everybody came. But you had to be there. If you weren't, it was a week of shame, a shocking example of violence and mayhem, a blight on Seattle's shining reputation, a disgrace" (12). Her quote neatly sums up discrepancies between accounts of the events in Seattle. Those who opposed the movement told broad, sweeping stories of global embarrassment or pathetic futility that glossed over the individuals and smaller groups involved and made much of a few broken windows. Participants

and supporters, on the other hand, tended to glamorize the individual, telling personal stories of triumph or hardship while distancing themselves from what other protestors (particularly those breaking windows or fighting back) did or didn't do.

This reliance on personal narrative permeates supportive accounts of N30. As a rhetorical tactic, the personal narratives work to shed light on the motivations of select individuals, and to gain sympathy from readers who are granted front-row seats to police brutality. In answering questions about what happened, though, these accounts seem limited and unreliable. In *5 Days That Shook the World*, Cockburn and St. Clair argue that the demonstrations put issues like sweatshops, labor struggles, world debt, and unequal trade exchanges on the center stage, but the text itself contains only anecdotes and a diary of the events; Janet Thomas's *The Battle in Seattle* tells personal stories − and those only from Northwesterners, excluding the voices of those who came to the protests from other parts of the country, or from overseas. The reader sees the Battle of Seattle, and the causes leading up to it, only through the eyes of Seattlites and their immediate neighbors.

Many of these narratives echo the sentiments expressed by Janet Thomas above. If you were there, you knew you'd changed the world. If you weren't though, things became muddier. One claim made by demonstrators is that the WTO talks collapsed in part (or wholly) due to their efforts. Certainly most participants of the protests believe that their actions directly or indirectly led to the collapse of the talks. Detractors tell a different story. Thomas Friedman, one of the most vocal critics, wrote (even as events were still unfolding) "Is there anything more ridiculous in the news today than the protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle?" Calling demonstrators a "Noah's ark of flat-earth advocates, protectionist trade unions and yuppies looking for their 1960's fix," he claims that protestors had been "duped by knaves like Pat

Buchanan […] into thinking that power lies with the WTO." Since the WTO can accomplish nothing anyway, he suggests, demonstrators are only making a spectacle of themselves, causing property damage and national embarrassment over nothing.

Ironically, Friedman goes on to deride their "circus" and says "You make a difference today by using globalization – by mobilizing the power of trade, the power of the Internet and the power of consumers to persuade, or embarrass, global corporations and nations to upgrade their standards. You change the world when you get the big players to do the right things for the wrong reasons. But that takes hard work – coalition-building with companies and consumers, and follow-up." Some of his critique is valid (and anticipates the success of buy-local movements like those discussed in the preceding chapter) but he seems unaware that protestors *did* harness the power of globalization and coalition-building, to mobilize consumers, NGOs, small companies, and others. Friedman's problem seems to be that they marshaled these things for the wrong ideology. His commentary indicates how distorted the message of the protestors became, but more importantly says something about the lack of cooperation in all these rhetorical competitions. We might expect Friedman to see the globalized network of protestors either as hypocrisy or as a circumstance that adds nuance to their arguments, but ultimately he does neither. Like the narratives of the demonstrators, only one side of the story is being told here.

Nor is Friedman alone in this narrow vision of the demonstrators' failure. Friedman's comments are representative of a series of claims that the protests were firecrackers – all smoke and flash, no real damage done or lasting impression left. This is true even of those who acknowledge the clout of the WTO, who dismiss the demonstrators by basing their objections on claims about the destabilizing effect of factors outside the demonstrations. Things fell apart, they

admit, but not because of a few teamsters and turtles. Echoing sentiments like Friedman's about the futility of the protests, an article in the *New York Times* on December 2nd takes a different approach and calls the clash a "warning for both sides" ("Messages"). Protestors' messages were lost in vandalism, and the WTO received a slap on the wrist for being too insular and insensitive to environmental and labor issues. The WTO, they suggest, would be wise to learn from the demonstrations, but they argue that more damage was done to the demonstrators' causes than to the organization's. Another piece a few days later goes further, arguing that experts had already condemned the Millennium Round of talks as premature, and thus "the failed talks auger no general calamity." Instead they suggest "Trade will continue to be governed by rules that have served the trading community well for over 50 years" ("Collapse"). This isn't to say that no damage at all was done – for instance, the failed talks meant that certain trade barriers would last longer, and reforms be delayed still longer – but in the end the *Times* seem confident that these changes will still take place, albeit later. *The Guardian* makes similar observations, pointing out that even before either side began arriving in Seattle, tensions between the delegates were already showing, and they had failed to agree on more than two paragraphs of the lengthy draft ministerial declaration. Many seemed to feel that the talks had been called too soon and were doomed from the start, protestors or no.

There's another way to think about this, however. Some supporters argue that to bicker about who closed down what misses the point. The world was still changed, they say, but the changes were less physical and more ideological. Whether or not the demonstrations had much impact on the WTO itself, or world economics, some insist that it worked wonders for individuals struggling with their seeming impotence in a globalized world. Ronnie Cummins, director of the Purefood Campaign claims that "Seattle made people feel as if they had some

power once again" (Cockburn 7). In *Multitude* Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call Seattle "the first global protest," and argue that it represents "the first major protest against the global system as a whole, the first real *convergence* of the innumerable grievances against the injustices and inequalities of the global system" and claim that it "opened a cycle of similar protests" (286). And *The Art of Protest* suggests that while the magnitude of the change is debatable, those who study resistance and social movements can at least agree that Seattle "represent[s] a turning point at which forces arrayed against corporate globalization took on a new level of self-awareness and confidence" (Reed 241). Those dismayed at the damage they perceived as the result of globalized capital found themselves in a network of like-minded potentially allies. Alliances were forged, and common ground was found (sometimes, such as with the Teamsters and turtles, in unexpected places). Those accustomed to being ignored or silenced fought back, for the world to see, and if not everyone really "got" what they were about, they at least sat up and took notice.

And at least one change can't be disputed by either side of the debate. Events in Seattle also represented, for the US, a new standard in how cities respond to demonstrations. Seattle's police were criticized for being underprepared, for being unable to clear streets, for their brutality toward protestors. Police Chief Norm Stamper lost his job in the aftermath of the demonstrations, and Seattle became a lesson to other cities. Janet Thomas laments that in some ways the conversation after N30 became more about how the police should have responded, and how they might respond in the future than about the justice of any of the issues raised by protestors. Rather than encouraging citizens to question the status quo, Seattle instead prompted officials to re-think police procedures and crowd control in urban environments. Rather than

becoming a narrative about citizen engagement (whether beneficial or harmful engagement), for many Seattle serves to bolster narratives about domestic terrorism.

"THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING"

Seattle's most lasting impact might be in these competing narratives – triumph, national embarrassment, citizenship, terrorism – and in the images of the protests. As I hinted at above, since 1999, stories (some true, some false) and footage from the demonstrations have been used to prep police in other cities for the possibility of civil disobedience. Images of fire in the streets and broken glass are used to alarm officials, citizens, and police, while from the other side images of the gassed and helpless protestors are used to win sympathy and prepare potential demonstrators in other cities for the abuse they may face. The story, and the images that accompany it, are so compelling that in 2007 Stuart Townsend made his directorial debut with *Battle in Seattle*, a film bearing the tagline "The whole world is watching."

Townsend's film, as one of the best recognized representations of the events of N30, is worth a closer look. The film follows a small group of protestors: Jay, presumably meant to represent a Direct Action Network leader, haunted by the death of his brother in a protest some years ago; Lou, a middle-class deserter with a threadbare tough-guy attitude, who set fire to her father's lab in protest of his animal testing; law-student Samantha, who wants to help but is horrified and frightened by the violence she sees; and easy-going and oft-arrested Django, played by Outkast's Andre 3000, who is what might be described as a career activist. These four are followed through a brief portrayal of opening ceremonies, into the escalation of police violence and protestor vandalism on Tuesday, past Wednesday's stubborn refusal to quit the streets (where Lou, Django, and finally Jay are arrested), and through the end of the week, where Jay and company learn from protestors outside the jail that talks have fallen through, and that most

of them will be released. Mixed up in this is Dale, a police officer whose wife is mistakenly injured by officers during the confusion, and who beats Jay savagely in the aftermath of learning his wife's injuries have resulted in a miscarriage.

My synopsis undoubtedly gives some sense of potential problems with the narrative of the film. Aside from isolated moments (Django tries to explain to the press why the WTO is harmful, a Doctors Without Borders representative is furious that everyone is more interested in the protests than in hearing his plea for aid) much of the focus of the film is on individual tensions. We see the mayor of Seattle getting pressure from the governor of Washington, and in turn putting pressure on the police chief. Jay and Lou become romantically involved, and the film dwells on Lou's concerns that Jay is a coward because he lacks her militancy, and Jay's preoccupation as he is haunted by his brother's death. Samantha yearns to help but worries about her legal career and is unable to bring herself to be part of the violence she sees. Early in the film, Dale's wife agonizes over her fear that she's not ready to have a baby, and we later see Dale's anguish[7] when he is denied time off from work after she miscarries. Like the memoirs written by N30 participants, the film is most interested in the stories of individuals.

Given that it is, after all, a film and not a documentary, this makes sense, but in showing us Seattle the film allows us to hear only a few voices. In the interest of keeping the story moving, these voices belong to characters who fit a particular mold - they must have interesting reasons for being involved, must have personal conflicts to resolve, and must be sympathetic.

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[7] It seems worth mentioning here that police were also victims of these events, which the film does make clear. Many of them suffered from fatigue and stress. In spite of being well-prepared for the possibility of violence, some officers were not provided with food or sufficient time to take breaks to eat, or even use the restroom. It seems likely that a certain amount of the violence could be attributed to a police force edgy about whether protestors would be violent themselves, while wearing heavy riot gear for hours without a break or a meal. There are accounts of demonstrators (who were equipped with water and food, gas masks or bandanas, and even diapers) offering to share food and water with police. Not every confrontation between the two sides was uncongenial.

They must also allow Townsend to show as much of the action as possible, with the result that the protagonists move from one location to another, seeming to exist outside the protests rather than as integrated parts of them. We are not exposed to the perspective of anyone who stayed in the human chain for half a day, for example, and we see nothing from the perspective of those breaking windows, or of the police officer who mistakenly (or uncaringly) assaults Dale's pregnant wife during the smoke and confusion. The film falls into the same pattern as accounts like those of Cockburn and Thomas, unable to take in the wide and diverse body of participants, and picking out a few heroes and victims to focus on.

This is to be expected, though. The film does what its genre demands. But the emotionally engaging qualities of narrative, for the film as for the accounts, come at a price. Even as the film shows us individuals like Django and the Doctors Without Borders representative, trying to make their silenced voices heard, the film itself can only function by silencing voices. As with the written accounts, there are no representations of other places – Seattle is Sam's home and the others (aside from Lou, who shows every sign of staying with Jay anyway) appear to reside there as well. The whole world may be watching, but there are limits to what they are able to see.

The narrative of the film also works to perpetuate harmful myths about events in Seattle. One of these is, perhaps obviously, about violence. Although a dramatic showdown between Jay, Lou, and some window-breaking vigilantes (presumably members of the Black Bloc) condemns their vandalism, saying it will only give the media something to feed on and distract from the real issues the film itself dwells, almost lovingly, on the images of the shattering windows. (Perhaps in order to avoid royalties issues, *Battle* is also unable to portray how even these acts of supposedly random lawlessness were calculated. The film shows broken glass, panicked

shoppers, storeowners putting boards up to protect their stores. What we don't see is the contrast between local businesses – which were largely left alone – and stores like Niketown, which were targeted.) The movie, like some demonstrators and many officials and observers, deplores the "violence" of the Black Bloc in breaking these windows. As mentioned before, though, the group itself has been quick to argue (and to suggest that this stance was the motivation behind their action on N30) that to label their broken windows violence is to equate corporate property with human lives. Because they reject this elevation of corporate property, they insist that what they did was not violent (ACME Collective). Some protestors blame them for distorting the meaning of the protests, while Black Bloc members might argue that what they did was, for them, the *point* of the protests.

But the film also dwells on the police violence. Much is made of the battered protestors, innocents caught in the crossfire (including Dale's wife and one undercover police officer, both of whom are mistaken for protestors and beaten) and Dale's misplaced anger when he attacks Jay. The scene in which the grieving police officer batters the unresisting protestor is perhaps the longest moment of sustained violence in the film, much longer than the quick incidents between police and other protestors, which almost seem casual by comparison. Dale's violence is what we are closest to, and by this point in the film, we are prepared to accept that perhaps he has "good reasons" for his rage. When Dale comes to apologize to the incarcerated demonstrator, Jay (with one eye drooping and blackened, his lip split, and his face painfully swollen) suggests that the two of them have been swept up in larger forces, pitted against one another for reasons other than those they might have chosen.

In spite of this moment, the film remains about the clash between "good" and "bad" protestors, or between protestors and police, and the message of the protestors is largely buried

underneath, as are their motivations. In the scene where Django attempts to explain the reasoning behind the demonstrations to a reporter, she ultimately turns away, uninterested in his articulate and calm response, distracted by the chaos around her. And Django later points out in jail that before the protests, people didn't even know what the WTO was – and now, well, they still don't know what it is, only that it's bad. His wry comment is meant to illustrate the importance of baby steps, of slow progress, but it also highlights the limits of what the protestors were able to accomplish. In *The Battle for the Story of the Battle of Seattle,* N30 veteran Solnit points out that Townsend didn't actively seek out any participants of N30, with the result (Solnit feels) that the motivations of the characters are skewed. We see multiple flashbacks to the day Jay's brother died, as if only this could explain both his intense loyalty to his cause and his devotion to nonviolence, and it's clear that Lou feels obligated to atone for the sins of her father, so that "The myth here is that people protest or rebel because they – not the system – have a problem" (Solnit 45). The film makes Dale's violence into a father's grief, and the violence of the protestors (safely limited to the breaking windows) is seen as the work of a fringe group whose motives are little more than to cause chaos. Towards the end of the film, a newly resolute Samantha goes into the mayor's office to urge him to release the protestors, with the law firmly on her side. Civil disobedience is saved by the power of one person working within the system.

CONSEQUENCES

That ultimately the institutions of legal rights save the day is an important message given the uneasy relationship between citizenship and protest. The rhetoric of the film presents Jay and his fellows as prophets, accusers, or as soldiers, but not necessarily as participants in civic life. Because of that, it is difficult to picture the work of protest, inside this film, as the work of citizens. In some ways, the film even makes it difficult to see the demonstrations as work at all,

citizenly or otherwise. At times, *Battle* suggests that the demonstrations were a spontaneous uprising, or a relatively small protest that got out of hand. Early in the film, we see police examining the files of the four protagonists, expressing their uncertainty about what the demonstrators will do, and their concern that things may turn violent. All in all, they seem kept in the dark, and when WTO delegates are unable to get through the human chains the film shows both mayor and police chief responding with confused surprise. Several misleading things are going on here.

First, although it's true that a number of previously-uninvolved citizens swelled the protestors' numbers spontaneously when police gassed residential neighborhoods, in reality the demonstrations were meticulously planned. A comment in the film, made by Jay, refers to 6 months planning, but meetings about the WTO talks and what the reaction to them should be began as early as February 1999, about a month after Seattle was chosen for the Ministerial Conference. These meetings continued to be held monthly and by September organizers needed to secure a larger space to hold the participants. By October they were seeing 500+ at meetings and plans were already being finalized for WTO week (Thomas 128). And these numbers can't begin to represent the number of participants on email lists and message boards, who were unable to be present in Seattle until the week of the protests or at all. What often comes off like a spontaneous uprising was a year's worth of work, for both the protestors and the unions.

Nor was the city taken by surprise by reactions to the WTO. Not only did demonstrators make their intentions known to officials, but many citizens uninvolved in the demonstrations expressed ambivalence about inviting the WTO to liberal Seattle. In fact, in August of 1999, People for Fair Trade convinced King County to call for a resolution not to host the WTO at all, and were defeated 8 to 5 (Thomas 128). Far from being the work of a few masterminds with

legions at their command, Seattle happened as it did because large numbers of citizens, working both inside and outside official channels, and organizing cooperatively with one another, devoted a great deal of time and energy to expressing their opinions. Believing openness would serve them best, demonstration organizers made no attempt to hide their plans or hold secret meetings, so city officials had every opportunity to follow the evolution of the protests. And as mentioned before, a carnival of sorts took place in the week before the WTO opening ceremonies, with protestors from all over the country beginning to converge on Seattle, so surely some idea of the numbers must have been apparent to city officials. In the days before N30, some newspapers even ran itineraries of events linked to the demonstrations. The idea that all of Seattle wholeheartedly embraced the WTO, and was then surprised by spontaneous protesting is ludicrous. Perhaps more importantly, the idea that the protests were spontaneous, that this degree of civic participation happens naturally and effortlessly, is both ludicrous and dangerous.

I call these myths dangerous because they add to the difficulty we have in discussing what citizenship means, and what counts as an act of citizenship. Demonstrators chanted about "the power of the people," and that "this is what democracy looks like," but critics like Friedman spoke of them as misguided at best and thugs or traitors at worst. This response is a far cry from our exhortations to vote, proud stickers on Election Day for doing your duty, billboards reminding us to make our voices heard. Because the situation around these protagonists is one of violence (and violence that is portrayed as motivated by personal tensions, or caused by ineffable, irresistible larger forces), and because the actions of the protagonists are presented as spontaneous and/or illegal (the film opens with the group trespassing to hang a banner), it becomes impossible to see them as citizens. They act out of a sense of moral convictions, certainly, but not civic responsibility.

An example of how this confusion over what citizenship is manifests in the treatment of demonstrators by Seattle's then-mayor Paul Schell. In the film, Mayor Schell references his experience as a former Vietnam protestor to gain the goodwill of the demonstrators. He expresses his solidarity and admiration of them, saying he is willing for their "voice to be heard," but ends by warning them to "be tough on your issues, but be gentle on my town." The real Schell, who spent the 70s working for the Department of Community Development and was instrumental in having then-threatened Pike Place Market remain in public hands, has a record that suggests his cinematic sympathy was not feigned. And yet it was he (both in the film and in real life) who ordered the police to clear the protestors.

Because we find it so difficult to define or discuss citizenship, it is perhaps unsurprising that Schell is able to applaud the demonstrators as good citizens one day, and consider them criminals in the days following. What it means to "do citizenship" becomes slippery. It seems clear that informing yourself and taking a position is the mark of a good citizen. Speaking out against certain actions on the part of organizations or governments is also good citizenship – but only to a point. Inconveniencing others in the name of your principles, actually causing change outside the approved channels of votes, appeals and inoffensive, considerate demonstration – these things seem to transgress the parameters of citizenship. It is as if the citizen is always a step away from the criminal. What seems like "public" space, as the Seattle crowds learned, becomes corporate space or government space. It is easy to slide from occupying public property to trespassing, with all the legal consequences implied in the term. Both the critics' accounts then, and that of the film, seem to rely in part on distancing themselves from citizenship. Lunatic thugs clearly can't be acting out of civic responsibility, but the narrative of an unexpected uprising also clashes with our ideas about citizen identity.

Instead, while the film comes down wholeheartedly on the side of the triumphant demonstrators, it does so by painting them neither as criminals nor citizens. It clearly takes as its position the belief that the demonstrators shut down the WTO, portraying the Battle in Seattle as exactly that – a battle, the opening (victorious) salvo in a war. But in framing Seattle using military rhetoric, there are consequences. First, the film is able to neatly keep citizens on one side and protest on the other. The protagonists are soldiers, and thus heroes, but soldiers aren't civilians, and the violence soldiers occasionally need to exhibit is not a responsibility of citizens. "Innocent" bystanders such as Dale's wife are not drawn into this conflict other than as casualties; by the end of the film she and her husband are reconciled and while he may need to live with his guilt for battering Jay, she is absolved of the responsibility of speaking out against the conditions that led to these protests. Her part, as a citizen, is to be protected, by police (whether on the right side or the wrong side) or by heroic protesting soldiers.

CONCLUSIONS

We end then where we began, in a war of words, and it is here that I want to return to Burke's cooperative competition as a way of moving past that war. Rather than remaining in an entrenched position, cooperative competition asks participants to be open to one another in solving a problem, without asking them to compromise on what they want. Because of this, not everyone will actually get what they want in cooperative competition; Burke suggests only that participation will be transformative and allow differing voices to transcend the limits of their own position. Chantal Mouffe describes something similar when she argues that democratic theorists should work toward "the creation of a vibrant 'agonistic' public sphere of contestation" (3), one where conflict can be worked out between adversaries rather than enemies. In contrast to antagonism, "a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any

common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents" (20). In agonistic conflict, as in cooperative competition, no one is guaranteed to get what they want, but each agrees to respect the other and to leave themselves open to being changed by other participants.

We see this most clearly in the much-circulated accounts of Teamsters and Turtles. In a lengthy passage of *Multitude,* Hardt and Negri argue that the real significance of the demonstrations was in providing a "convergence center" for diverse groups with intersecting or similar concerns:

> The magic of Seattle was to show that these many grievances were not just a random, haphazard collection, a cacophony of different voices, but a chorus that spoke in common against the global system. ... [The] various affinity groups come together or converge not to unite into one large centralized group; they remain different and independent but lock together in a network structure. The network defines both their singularity and their commonality. (288)

The narrative accounts of participants speak to this, as many of them describe being transformed, or being caught up in something magical. In the aftermath of the demonstrations, *The Nation* spoke optimistically of the newly-minted alliances, claiming that supposed enemies such as "Machinists and antilogging activists didn't just march together, they learned from each other," and quoted one steelworker as saying "Now, after hanging out with these green kids, I know there's another way to do this. We can preserve the old-growth trees. We can have sustainability. I guess I'm an environmentalist now" ("Democracy"). A similar spirit motivates the collection of organizers from both large and small activist groups into the Direct Action Network responsible for orchestrating so much of the demonstrations, or that of the participation of people from all walks of life, with diverse affiliations, in the human chains that blocked WTO delegates from reaching the conference. Part of what makes these cooperative moments so appealing was the

sense that individual groups maintained their autonomy and individual goals, while taking one another seriously as partners in a conversation about how to tackle public problems.

A spirit of cooperative competition might tell a story similar to the one I've begun here – about citizens who worked both inside and outside of institutions to make their voices heard and who in doing so were part of a larger movement of global citizens concerned about population, health care, labor rights, the environment, in short, the public good. Instead, the rhetoric of war seems more comfortable for us than difficult discussions about the boundaries of citizenship. We know a war is over when it is won, and until it is won, it continues to be a war[8]. Both Townsend's film and the writing of N30 participants suggests that the battle of Seattle was decisively won, and is now over, the city safely defended.

In falling back on war-like discourse, the work that went into these connections, and subsequently did or did not go into maintaining them is lost, as subtleties are swept aside in the face of "us vs. them." Also lost are the attempts by those not on the battlefield to participate in the conversation about the global practices represented by the WTO. In the weeks leading up to the demonstrations, Hardt and Negri note that "High school teachers had focused their classes on global issues, university students had studied global trade, church groups and political activists had planned street theatre and held seminars on nonviolent protest, lawyers had organized teams of observers and legal aid in case of arrests" (285). Only some of these people would later be in the streets of Seattle, but all sought to be involved in the larger questions about how to address the world's problems. Similarly, in making the story of N30 the story of a battle in, of, or for Seattle, discussion around the demonstrations excises the history of world-wide protest that has attended the WTO since its birth, and ignores the global protests that occurred in solidarity with Seattle. The event becomes talked about as if it happened one time, in one place, or, at best, as if

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[8] Witness the Wars on Drugs, Terror, Women, and Christmas, to name a few.

it somehow began something that moved on from there. In reality, the Seattle demonstrations were embedded in a web of similar conflicts, motivated by world-wide events, using tactics passed from one veteran protestor to another.

The final scenes of Townsend's film nod to this network, showing the four protagonists, newly released from jail, walking away together through the empty, debris-ridden streets. A darkened cinema displays the words "Thanks WTO It's Been A Riot." They seem to be heading to a bar, as Django is heard saying that the drinks are on him, and jokes "one down, a billion to go." As the screen goes dark on them, an epilogue of words and images appears. The film lets us know that after Seattle "governments would never be caught off-guard again," and that from then on 2-mile exclusion zones became the norm at protests. Scenes are shown from protests in Doha, Qatar (2001), where the WTO expressed a commitment to environmental safety and fair labor conditions, and Cancun, Mexico (2003), where developing countries again walked out on talks. The 36 million protesting the war in Iraq appear. By 2007, an update says, the promises made at Doha show little hope of fulfillment. Clashes between protestors and police appear, with the names of places like battlefields: Washington DC, Genoa, Switzerland, Ecuador, Miami, India, South Korea, Philippines, Honduras, Hong Kong, and finally "Everywhere." The final message before the credits reads simply "The Battle continues…"

On the one hand, this ending undermines the false idea that the conflict in Seattle was "won," and is now finished. In these scenes, the demonstrations are connected to similar moments world-wide, and we are encouraged to see the work done in Seattle as ongoing, or at least to see ourselves as part of a world-wide army, which might be called to arms at any time. The rhetoric of war can show war, though, but not what comes after. And for Seattle, what came after was underwhelming. Demonstrators could not agree on whether their objective was to

eliminate or reform the WTO, and so it goes without saying that they had no long-term structure in place. The short-term goal of shutting down the talks, winning the battle, made it possible to avoid discussing longer-term goals about what demonstrators actually wanted from the WTO and their governments. Because the Battle in Seattle is part of a war, and not an act of citizenship, even the competing narratives within the demonstrations – globalization is bad, globalization can be a force for good, we must respect corporate property, vandalism is not violence – are never required to make use of their conflicts, to transcend their individual limitations. If Seattle was a battle, then the demonstrators may have won. If the work of protest is not warfare, though, and is instead something else, something more like civic engagement, then the work of protest doesn't end with putting away our signs and putting out the fires in the streets.

Chapter 4 Rhetorical Agency and the "Shoe-Throwers' Index"

On December 17th 2010, frustrated fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself after police confiscated his cart. Unable to find other work, and repeatedly harassed by officials, either because he lacked proper permits or because he was unable or unwilling to bribe them, the 26-year-old set himself on fire in protest. Other Tunisians, sympathizing with his pain and humiliation, his unemployment and sense of helplessness, protested in the town of Sidi Bouzid. Reuters, calling Tunisia "one of the most prosperous and stable" countries in the region, commented on the unexpectedness of the "rioting." A month later, the Tunisian government had been overthrown, and Egyptians occupied the street, calling for a similar regime change. The Arab Spring had begun.

Revolutionaries and supporters on sites like Twitter and Facebook presented the Arab Spring as a fire of liberation, spreading inevitably from one place to the next. The relatively quick ousting of Tunisia's president (and later Egypt's) aided this narrative, so that for many the revolution felt like a done deal even in countries where it had not yet "started." Many Arab leaders and state-run or monitored news sources, on the other hand, presented the outbreak as precisely that - an illness, brought on by foreign influences. These malicious, or at least misguided outsiders had infected a small group of young people with a discontent that would pass as long as they were dealt with sympathetically but firmly. A significant portion of the Arab Spring's global audience, however, including that in the United States, constructed a narrative about a long-oppressed people inevitably rebelling, successfully or not, against intolerable conditions in search of democracy and economic opportunity.

On February 3, 2011, amid continuing revolution in Egypt and unrest in Yemen and Sudan, *The Economist* published an article asking "Who will be next?" Several days later, *The*

Economist developed "The Shoe-Thrower's Index," an attempt to predict by mathematical calculation "where the scent of jasmine[9] may spread next." A month later, after (unforeseen) unrest in Bahrain and Libya, *The Economist* introduced a revised, interactive version of the Index to its website. Its readers, amateurs and experts alike, could attempt to account for the current uprisings, and predict future ones, by tweaking the weight given to factors on the Index such as GDP per person or freedom of press. Predicting unrest in the Arab world became a game anyone could play.

This chapter is the most recent, but also represents the one with the widest concerns for citizenship. In the last chapter, participants were connected to a global movement, but still largely concentrated on a single city. Here, participants identify on both a national and regional level. This chapter also represents slightly different aims than those preceding it. Although I believe that revolution can be an act of citizenship, my argument is more about what discussion of revolution - as the act of an unhappy citizenry - reveals about contended citizens.

In this chapter, I will open with some background and discussion of the events popularly known as the "Arab Spring"[10], and then examine the "Shoe-Throwers' Index" more closely. I argue that the Index, in attempting to explain or predict revolution, reduces the acts of Arab citizens (perhaps all citizens) to inevitable response to environment. This argument relies on a rhetoric of mathematics: introduce sufficient amounts of certain elements to a nation, and its people will explode in unrest; remove or reduce those elements, and the people will remain inert.

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[9] A reference to the prevalence of the flower in Tunisia - prior to the participation of other countries, the events in Tunisia were referred to as the Jasmine Revolution.

[10] The name "Arab Spring" is problematic to me. It establishes a sense of boundary that is utterly misleading, as if the events that began in late 2010 and played out all through 2011 can be severed cleanly and presented as a whole. To do this ignores the decades of Middle Eastern unrest that preceded that "spring," the escalation of that unrest in the years prior to Tunisia's uprising, and the messy and ongoing aftermath of the revolutions in countries such as Egypt and Syria. While I find myself using the term Arab Spring, it's important to keep in mind that it is an imperfect media construction.

I will also show that this attitude manifests in the language of some Arab leaders, who attempt to persuade their citizens that their countries don't meet the "criteria" for revolution. This rhetoric relies on a predictive logic which, strangely enough, obscures its own use of rhetoric and fails to account for its influence, divorcing citizens' actions from their ability to persuade and be persuaded by others. Against this predictive logic, I will set the language used by some of the revolutionaries and their supporters, in particular those involved in Wael Ghonim's "Kullena Khaled Said" Facebook page. For these individuals, revolution is not simply a response to intolerable conditions, but an act of solidarity with others, and an opportunity to participate in creating better conditions.

MAPPING THE PATH OF PROTEST

The self-immolation of vendor Mohamed Bouazizi is popularly conceived of as the catalyst for the Arab Spring. In the two and a half weeks between the immolation and his death, as his story spread, his fellow Tunisians took to the streets, protesting the economic conditions and corruption that had driven Bouazizi to this extremity. In late December, after a week and a half of protesting, then-president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali appeared on television, appealing to protesters with both the carrot and the stick. While warning that the law "in all firmness" would come down on protesters, Ben Ali also reshuffled his government and promised that something would be done about Tunisia's high unemployment (Borger). After two more televised, increasingly conciliatory speeches, Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14th, ten days after Bouazizi's death. By this time, there had been protests in Algeria, including the self-immolation of Mohsen Bouterfif; unrest in Libya had prompted ruler Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-

Qaddafi to publically condemn the Tunisian protesters; and thousands of Egyptians had already promised on Facebook to attend the country's first Day of Rage[11] on Jan 25th.

As January progressed, Egyptians occupied the streets, and protesters in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen staged their own Days of Rage. Amid fire and violence, after the requisite three increasingly-desperate speeches, Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11th. Although similar uprisings continued to occur in Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, and elsewhere, the next country to take the media stage was Libya, which by August had ousted Qaddafi, although not without intervention from the global community and the deaths of thousands. By the end of the year, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain would join the list, with varying levels of change and bloodshed.

Discussions of the Arab Spring, in fact, often happen in list form. Many of the books on the subject, and the "Major events" section of the Wikipedia page are all organized in what is popularly perceived as the order of revolution: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain. Visual representations expose some of the messiness behind these lists. One example, an interactive timeline on *The Guardian's* website, "The Path of Protest," gives some sense of how difficult it is to compose an orderly history of the Arab Spring (Blight et al). Seventeen Arab nations are included here, and the timeline assigns events one icon for protests or government responses to protests, another for the nebulous "political move" (usually an attempt by a leader to placate rebellious citizens), another for regime changes (not to be confused with the firing of a member of a president or leader's staff, which is considered a political move), and a fourth for international or external responses.

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[11] The Days of Rage followed a series of protests beginning June 14th, 2010, referred to as the Silent Stands, during which protestors wore black and silently prayed or read from Bibles or the Quran, in protest of the brutal death of Khaled Said at the hands of Egyptian police. This was done in order to get around the emergency law, in place in Egypt since 1981, which made it impossible to protest openly. The Day of Rage was certainly a step further, but occurred neither in a vacuum nor as a direct result of the events in Tunisia.

There are limits here as well. The icons are linked to news stories, so that the Path becomes less a map of events and more a map of media coverage. This means that the map begins with the death of Bouazizi, as the perceived catalyst, and includes no mention of earlier unrest. But regardless of how media coverage in the United States may have made it appear, Egypt's uprising was hardly spontaneous, nor was it a domino-like response to Tunisia's uprising. Long before Bouazizi's death, in late 2004, the Kefaya movement (the Egyptian Movement for Change whose name means "enough") held a small demonstration (fewer than 1000) calling for Mubarak to step down. Their protests continued regularly into 2005, and in May of that year protesters were attacked by police and Mubarak supporters. Kefaya, though, had its origin in the years preceding 2005, including vocal protests against the war in Iraq. Egypt also experienced over 1900 demonstrations between 2004 and 2005 by labor movements (Rutherford 38). The April 6th Youth Movement emerged in the spring of 2008 to support one such demonstration by workers in El-Mahalla El-Kubra, and although public activism generated by the April 6th movement did not match their online presence, they nonetheless brought labor concerns to a wider audience and prompted political engagement in previously uninvolved citizens. And six months prior to Bouazizi's self-immolation, the "Kullena Khaled Said" Facebook page founded by Wael Ghonim, which I will discuss in greater detail later, was actively holding demonstrations.

The difficulty of showing the start of the Arab Spring isn't the only concern with "The Path of Protest." The map also ends, abruptly, at the end of 2011, although in many ways the events of 2011 continue today. Moreover, in assigning events linked to news stories to its four categories, the map both limits what becomes worthy of note, what counts as a "protest" or a "response," and tells us how to interpret events. The Silent Stands for Khaled Said in Egypt

referenced above, silent protests that preceded the Day of Rage, don't make it onto the map, for instance. International or external responses don't include online support within and outside of the Middle East. Government responses to protesters don't include the attempts by some Arab nations to post photos on Facebook and invite regime supporters to identify protesters. As much is happening off the Path as on it. These limitations notwithstanding, what the Path *does* show is how protests and demonstrations happened not like a fire spreading from one country to another, but like explosions with shrapnel landing all over. The idea that a domino of rebellion was tipped in Tunisia with Bouazazi's self-immolation and that what followed was the orderly, predictable toppling of other dominoes in the sequence, is an illusion crafted by media coverage. While this illusion of a coherent list is understandable, it impacts attempts to make sense of the Arab Spring. A feedback loop is created whereby the list influences rhetoric about the Arab Spring, which in turn reinforces the idea of a mathematics of revolution.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

As revolution spread, there was an understandable need to make sense of the events, and to answer questions like *Why now? Why these places in this order? What do the revolutions and revolutionaries have in common?* Scholars of the Arab Spring suggest that a number of factors created the impulse for uprising. In countries like Egypt, people experienced denial of their basic rights, because the country had been under a state of emergency continuously since 1981, which suspended individual rights, and increased police authority and censorship. In combination with this, Egypt experienced massive (and often blatant) government corruption. Other Arab nations also endured government officials who refused to perform basic services without a bribe, and experienced sham elections that left individuals with no voice in their governments. Inhabitants in many countries, especially those without oil resources, suffered from widespread poverty,

along with a rising cost of living. In some nations, Egypt among them, belated attempts to implement neoliberal policies in order to quality for World Bank or WTO aid had eroded food subsidies without creating jobs or greater buying power for the population. Many countries suffered from very high unemployment. These conditions led to a frustrated, disenfranchised population, unable to find work, barely getting by, with no way to make their voices heard and who saw no sign of improvement on the horizon.

These factors alone do not appear to account for the presence of revolution, however. Other factors intersect with those listed above. Many have written about what is called the "youth bulge," a disproportionately large number of young people, in Arab countries as a key factor in the revolutions. In the Middle East as a whole, roughly a third of the population is under 25, and Haas and Lesch point out that these bulges are "particularly pronounced in those countries that experienced the most widespread and powerful protests," with Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria containing populations under 25 of 42%, 48%, 51%, and 57% respectively (3). These populations are hampered by rising unemployment, even when they are highly educated. In Egypt, for instance, 60% of 18-29 year olds are among the unemployed (this number is 83% for women in that age group), and Egyptian college-educated youth rank the highest for unemployment (Gelvin 20). In some countries, marriage is often possible only once financial stability is acquired, with the result that many of the unemployed or marginally employed young people must delay starting families of their own. Highly educated, unable to find work or start families, the young people of the Arab world might easily have felt they had nothing to lose.

The high percentage of frustrated young people in countries like Egypt is also significant because of the role social media played in the Arab Spring. Protesters organized on Facebook and Twitter, and used cellphones on the ground to coordinate large demonstrations. They also

used social media to post updates, personal accounts, and videos to the global community. Opinions on the significance of social media range from those who would call it a Twitter Revolution to those who believe social media was only one factor (and perhaps not the most important factor) in bringing about revolution. Scholars like Lynch, for instance, stress that the role of social media in protest in Arab countries goes back much further than early 2011 and extends beyond Twitter and Facebook. He also argues that because of its popularity, reputation for balanced coverage, and accessibility Al-Jazeera likely did more to craft a coherent Arab Spring narrative than either Facebook or Twitter.

Some things seem obvious, though. Certainly, the youth of these countries were well-versed in using Twitter, Facebook, and mobile phones, and aware of their potential as collaborative tools. For years, dissidents in the Arab world had flocked to the internet because they lacked access to forms of political communication like television, radio, or newspapers, and because the internet allowed them to direct political criticism anonymously, beyond the range of censors or retaliation (Howard and Hussain "Introduction"). In countries with higher internet access, individuals were already accustomed to social networking sites and cellphone use, and political dissenters were already using digital media to spread criticism and call for change. And although some countries blocked popular social media sites, revolutionaries were flexible enough to find alternative ways to access these sites, or, as in Libya when Facebook was blocked, to use online dating sites to exchange messages about meetings and plans (Howard and Hussain Ch. 1). But as Howard and Hussain argue, "It is not that Tunisians and Egyptian decided to have political protests and turned to digital media for logistical support" (Ch. 1). Rather, they looked to convenient and familiar platforms in order to organize and connect with one another.

Social media not only allowed artists to plan demonstrations, but also brought them support – both from other Arab countries and the wider global community. Activists learned from veterans of protests worldwide whose collective experience spanned decades, and who were eager to pass tips around. Websites such as boingboing.net helped protesters protect their online anonymity and YouTube released its restrictions of violence in videos so state retaliation could be broadcast to the world. *The Atlantic Monthly* had an "Activist Action Plan" translated and hosted, and Telecomix circulated a guide for getting around service shut-downs instituted by the state (Howard and Hussain Ch. 1). *Time* published a call to arms, putting volunteers with the knowledge to construct ad hoc mobile networks in touch with venture capitalist and tech investor Shervin Pishevar (Townsend).

"THE SHOE-THROWER'S INDEX"

So while no single factor may appear likely to have caused the series of protests and revolutions, experts soon gathered a list of factors that seemed significant, and as events unfolded in first Tunisia and then Egypt, political scholars and media outlets working to determine the causes of revolution hoped to use those same significant factors to predict further uprisings. If similar factors produced revolution in two countries, why wouldn't unrest spread to other countries experiencing similar conditions? Tunisia alone could be an isolated incident, but Egypt turned an incident into a trend. Protestors predicted further uprisings with energetic optimism, media outlets and global spectators with varying degrees of sympathy and anxiety. As *The Economist* put it in "Variously Vulnerable," an article published in early February, events in Tunisia and Egypt had most of the Arab League's 22 countries (shown in Figure 1) asking "Who will be next?" To answer that question the article focused on Yemen and Sudan, both of which had recently seen protesting in the streets, in Yemen to demand the departure of Ali Abdullah

Saleh and in Sudan to protest unemployment and the cost of living ("Variously"). Given the presence of demonstrations in the street, these two countries seemed like excellent candidates for the next revolution. What didn't seem to be up for debate was the question of whether anyone at all would be next - the only question was who.

Several days later, *The Economist* published "The Shoe-Thrower's Index," a reference perhaps to the shoe thrown by a journalist at President George W. Bush at a 2008 press conference in Baghdad. In some parts of the world, including the Middle East, shoes, especially the soles of shoes, can represent the dirt they come in contact with. Striking someone with a

Poor performance
The Arab League

Country	Ruler	Date of accession	2010 world ranking for:		
			democracy*	corruption†	press freedom‡
Algeria	Abdelaziz Bouteflika	1999	125	105	141
Bahrain	King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa	1999	122	48	153
Comoros	Ahmed Sambi	2006	127	154	102
Djibouti	Ismael Omar Guelleh	1999	126	91	159
Egypt	Hosni Mubarak	1981	138	98	130
Iraq	Nuri al-Maliki	2006	111	175	144
Jordan	King Abdullah II	1999	117	50	140
Kuwait	Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah	2006	114	54	115
Lebanon	Najib Mikati	2011	86	127	115
Libya	Muammar Qaddafi	1969	158	146	192
Mauritania	Muhammad Ould Abdelaziz	2009	115	143	118
Morocco	King Mohammed VI	1999	116	85	146
Oman	Sultan Qaboos	1970	143	41	153
Palestinian territories	Mahmoud Abbas/Ismail Haniyeh	2005/2006	93	Not ranked	181
Qatar	Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani	1995	137	19	146
Saudi Arabia	King Abdullah	2005	160	50	178
Somalia	Sheikh Sharif Ahmed	2009	Not ranked	178	181
Sudan	Omar al-Bashir	1989	151	172	165
Syria	Bashar Assad	2000	152	127	178
Tunisia	Mohamed Gannouchi	2011	144	59	186
United Arab Emirates	Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan	2004	148	28	153
Yemen	Ali Abdullah Saleh	1978	146	146	173

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit's *Democracy Index*; Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*; Freedom House's *Freedom of the Press*; The Economist   Out of: *167 †178 ‡196 countries or territories

Figure 1 "Poor performance," The Economist, February 9, 2011.

shoe, or throwing one at them are likely to be taken as insults anywhere, but in some Arab nations even sitting with the soles of your shoes facing another person can be considered insulting (Duke). The act represents contempt, therefore, and must have seemed a fitting reference to the crowds demanding the expulsion of their leaders. The goal of the Index was to predict further uprisings by ranking 17 of the Arab League nations by "ascribing a weighting of 35% for the share of the population that is under 25; 15% for the number of years the government has been in power; 15% for both corruption and lack of democracy as measured by existing indices; 10% for GDP per person; 5% for an index of censorship and 5% for the absolute number of people younger than 25" ("Shoe-

Thrower's Index"). Although they admit the importance of factors such as unemployment or the nebulous "dissent", the *Economist* does not include these factors because obtaining accurate information is so difficult. They end by inviting comments and suggestions. A month later, readers were invited to "Build your own revolutionary index" on a revised and interactive version of the chart – this time one that included adult literacy rates and percentage of internet users.

The factors included mirror many of those identified by scholars, but the form the Shoe-Thrower's Index takes reduces the complexity of revolution to an equation. If a high enough percentage of enough factors are present, the country will be a certain percent unstable and thus have a certain likelihood of revolution. Although the article admits that it can't be perfect, the

Figure 2 "The shoe-thrower's index," The Economist, March 14, 2011.

suggestion is that imperfections are the result of inadequate or unavailable data. No mention is made of the fact that Tunisia (11th, at 50% unstable) is ranked considerably below Egypt (3rd, with nearly 70% instability). The third article in the series mentions that since February 9th Libya (2nd on their list) and Bahrain (13th) have seen unrest, but doesn't attempt to explain this. They note that since the original index they have "added two further indicators that

were not included in the original ... and made the whole index interactive." While the article never says as much, the reader is left with the feeling that the new chart was intended as an attempt to refine the equation which failed to predict Bahrain's unrest. And because the new chart was interactive, readers could determine for themselves how much weight to place on the presence of corruption, or how significant the number of internet users was. The suggestion seems to be that while the original chart may have been incomplete, or lacked sufficient categories, the idea behind it is solid. Users could work with the new tools, perfecting them.

The final version of the Index, shown in Figure 2, shows their "weighted index of unrest" from Yemen (86.5) to Qatar (20.7) on the left, and the indicator weights to the right. Each category (years in power, % of population under 25, total population under 25, GDP per person, democracy ranking, corruption ranking, press freedom ranking, adult literacy, and Internet users) has a slider the user can move to determine the importance of the factor. Adjusting one or more of these causes the index to shuffle the countries into their new positions. A mouse rollover of any country brings up a window with information showing a photograph and name for each country's leader and statistics about the country. For instance, rolling over Iraq brings up a photo and date of accession for Nuri al-Maliki, the total population (31.3 million, 60.6% of whom are under 25), and similar statistics for literacy and internet user. The information on democracy, corruption and freedom of press are drawn from a world-wide ranking and so rather than percentages or simple numbers the window shows that Iraq ranks 112/167 for Democracy, 175/178 for Corruption, and 144/196 in Press Freedom ("Build"). None of the information provided here, outside of the leader's name and picture, is not also represented by a slider. It is as if we know everything we need to know about each country - even a history of other protests seems irrelevant under the Index's predictive logic.

Reponses to "Build your own revolutionary index," based on the comments, are telling. Some readers posted their own top results, usually sharing the weights they used to achieve these results. Comments such as this one - "Not so bad. Still have to find a way to get rid of Yemen" (Irinc) are characteristic of this group. Another reader, DGlacia mentions that they "Tried for about 10 minutes to make Libya/Yemen/Syria/Egypt/Tunisia/Bahrain my top 6," and offers as explanation "Conclusions are: that Bahrain or Oman might be oddities in this list, that the most significant parameters might be Years in Power, GDP per capita and adult literacy, and that % of population under age 25 and total no. under age 25 are likely to be insignificant." Beneath this analysis, almost as an afterthought, the comment reads "Also, there might be other parameters that should be considered." This sentiment is shared by a number of readers, who posted comments like "If you can't get the right order and size/intensity of unrest, you might have the wrong indicators" (Konker) or "hmmm just tried to get Libya Tunisia Egypt and Bahrain as the top 4 and couldn't definitely missing some factors" (Corporateanarachist).

Other comments go further, offering the missing factors - popular suggestions are income gap, unemployment, religious strife, or food and fuel prices. Other suggestions are harder to quantify; BrokenPluralist argues that critical factors in Middle Eastern unrest are whether the government favors peace with Israel and whether the people perceive that government as a Western puppet. Admitting that the latter would be difficult to quantify, he or she adds that nonetheless not being perceived as a Western puppet is why there's "no sign of an uprising in Syria." Nor is this reader alone in trying to explain Syria's relative quiet at the time of the Index's publication, arguments that now seem tragic.

What's significant to me here, though, is the mindset adopted by these users of the Index. If Syria hasn't risen up, a factor must be wrong or missing. If the top five or six countries don't

match reality, the weights need to be adjusted or are skewed by a missing factor. Although there's limited curiosity about what might make inhabitants of a seemingly unstable country like Syria continue to express their citizenship without revolution, the majority are more concerned with "get[ting] rid of Yemen." They easily fall inline with the rhetoric of predictability, where citizens react in limited ways to measurable circumstances.

LIMITATIONS OF PREDICTION

My intention is not to suggest that the factors included in the Index aren't relevant in contributing to unrest or in measuring a citizenry's potential for resistance - they certainly are. But in examining them we see a particular definition of the contented citizen, and thus of the stable country. The Index suggests that stability relies on citizens who are able to participate regularly in making decisions about their government, who are not afflicted with crushing poverty, and who are kept informed by a relatively unfettered media. The more money they have, the freer their news outlets are, and the more democracy they have, the happier citizens must be. If good scores in these categories alone led to contented citizens, though, we would expect to see the Index and reality line up. As I have suggested throughout this project, though, this is an insufficient definition of citizenship, a problem the Index highlights.

Even readers who try to bring up the limitations of the Index run into difficulties. One or two comments want to see countries outside of the Arab League, especially those enduring under similar conditions of economic or democratic deprivation, added to the Index. Given that a number of the indicators are concerns in many countries, this seems an odd omission. Similar feelings about unemployment, lack of change, and limited economic mobility also characterized the U.S.'s Occupy movement, where, again, the role of social media was highlighted. How "unstable," according to the Index, are countries that don't appear on this list?

Others attempt to question the very idea of the Index. The Physicist says caustically that "the reason the riots started in say Tunisia is because a guy put himself on fire. That's hardly an indication that a 10 parameter deterministic toy model could make any predictive sense." Leaving aside the equally problematic conclusion expressed here, that a single person's act could lead conclusively to a revolution (an idea that is itself as much a media narrative as the idea that internet use or a youth bulge drives revolution), the comment nonetheless seems to suggest that there's more going on here than a model can represent or predict. Similarly, TheGrimReaper is wholly dismissive of the Index, calling it "simply irrelevent [sic]," and adding that "Index-making is a skewed outlook of a country "vulnerability rate."" Both go on to undermine their own points, however. The Physicist adds that making the Index is "like trying to figure out whether when you wake up next Tuesday morning you will be feeling up or down and not taking into account the weather, which you can't anyway..." And TheGrimReaper adds that "The required data aren't completely pooled together and only bits of information supplied by governments - sometimes downplayed to elude economic sanctions - are insufficient to gauge the potential danger ahead." Both these readers suggest that the Index is a problem, but because it requires information which is unavailable, perhaps because governments can't be trusted, perhaps because the information itself is unknowable. The Physicist's comment is especially telling perhaps, suggesting first that an Index can't measure revolution but then with the metaphor of the weather almost immediately falling back into the same language, so that the problem becomes less that you can't identify all the factors that go into determining how you will feel, and more that you can't get information for all of those factors.

There are a number of problems with applying what is almost certainly a Western understanding of citizenship to the Arab League nations, but even the largely Western audience

commenting on the Index contains these dissenting voices, suggesting that the definition presented here is insufficient even in our own culture. But while the factors and weights are questioned by the Index's users, and the possibility of crafting an adequate index at all is challenged by some dissenting voices, no one seems able to move beyond the idea of an equation in talking about revolution as an expression of citizenship.

The way of thinking represented by the rhetoric of the Index makes an appearance outside of *The Economist's* comments section. Predicting who would be next also meant predicting who wouldn't be next, and while media and protestors constructed a narrative lining up Arab nations like dominoes, political figures in the countries that appear on the Index were quick to introduce rhetorical moves or propose changes excluding themselves from future conflict. Tunisia's revolution began in December 2010, and almost immediately Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit called speculation that the revolution would spread to Egypt "nonsense" (Lynch Chapter 4), perhaps unaware that "Kullena Khaled Said" already intended to take to the streets in January. In mid-January, mere days before the occupation of Tahrir Square, Qaddafi insisted that the internet was all lies, nothing of value was being said there, and reports from the internet could not be relied on (globalvoicesonline). Rumors that revolution would spread were simply that, and the discerning audience would put no stock in them. In hindsight, these comments seem like wishful thinking, but many were aimed at encouraging other countries to distance themselves from the revolutions. As Lynch points out, "Other countries had good arguments for why they were not like Tunisia: Egypt was larger, Saudi Arabia wealthier, Jordan protected by a monarch and fears of Palestinian takeover, Syria immune thanks to its regionally popular...foreign policy" (Chapter 4). In response to the assumption that they knew what might incite or quell a rebellion, Jordan, Algeria, and Libya

lowered taxes or prices on food and imports. These statements and actions seem perfectly in line with the logic of the Shoe-Thrower's Index, understanding the ideal conditions of citizenship in terms of being provided for and approving of the decisions made by remote authorities, and suggesting that if all the variables aren't just right, revolution will not occur.

A month after Qaddafi's disparagement of the internet, his son, Sait al-Islam, argued in an interview with Libyan state television that "Libyans should not see themselves as Tunisians or Egyptians," and that "the situations were totally different" (Lynch Chapter 7), and Syria's Bashar al-Assad confidently told the *Wall Street Journal* that his own reforms had rendered his position stable, dismissing the efforts of Arab leaders like Mubarak to placate their citizens by saying "if [they] didn't see the need of reform before...it's too late to do any reform" (Lynch Chapter 7). The irony of Qaddafi and al-Assad's confidence aside, these statements represent attempts by the established leaders to create their own version of the Index. Qaddafi might have expected that Libyans would identify with his comments (and later those of his son) and see themselves as "not like" Tunisians or Egyptians, and thus not in need of revolution. Similarly, al-Assad's boasts invite Syrians to conclude that things might be bad in Egypt, but not in their own country, and thus Egypt's need for drastic measures should not be theirs. Even as activists on Twitter were developing a revolutionary timetable, presenting uprising as inevitable, these leaders responded with a counter-narrative asserting the opposite, acting largely on the same information the creators of the Shoe-Thrower's Index used to calculate instability.

WE ARE ALL KHALED SAID

Again, it seems important to stress here that the factors used in the Index and referenced by the words and actions of Arab leaders are far from irrelevant. Corrupt officials and sham elections are good indications that all is not well, and citizens who live with extreme poverty or

without opportunities for gaining employment or supporting a family have every reason to be angry. And it certainly seems to be the case that a literate population, young enough to take chances, and afforded the means to organize quickly are better able and more likely to participate in resistance movements. The point is not to dismiss these conditions, or to deride those who attempt to explain or understand revolutions. Instead, I am interested in how these factors come to dominate, even to limit, what it means to be a citizen.

In contrast, in this section I want to examine some of the ways that protesters used similar factors in order to explode the logic behind the Index. While their messages certainly touched on familiar topics - unemployment, sham elections and corruption, oppression, living under conditions of anxiety and fear - the protestors were uninterested in which country had less freedom of press, or whether that freedom should be a large or small factor. Rather they argued that citizens in most Arab countries lived under similar, and intolerable conditions, and that all should seek something better. Drawing inspiration from the successes around them, expressing sympathy for the failures, they used a pan-Arabic rhetoric that encouraged connections across the region without diminishing individual differences.

These connections were established partially through a shared language. While individual Arab League nations may have their own dialect or dialects, in the region as a whole most newspapers and news programs use Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). A 1995 study determined that less than 1% of media concerned with news or religion in the Arab world used the vernacular, making it easy for citizens to receive information about events in geographically distant nations (Mellor 124). Because dialect doesn't carry as much cultural prestige, politicians

tend to use Standard or Classical Arabic as well, slipping into dialect only occasionally.[12] Citizens in the Arab world share a common language, then, which allows communication across borders. But the connections created by the revolutionaries go beyond simply using MSA with one another. Words and slogans used in one country passed to another, and it was even the case that some words specific to the Egyptian dialect were used in countries where the local dialect had no such word. Language played a further role, as "Town squares that became the sites of protest throughout the Arab world were renamed "Tahrir" square after the main site of protest in Cairo," Gelvin reports (31). The "Day of Rage," begun by Egyptian protesters was also imitated in other countries, so that on any given Friday many countries might hold simultaneous Days of Rage.

If Tahrir became a way of linking physical sites of resistance, social networking allowed for other linked sites. In particular, Google employee Wael Ghonim's Facebook page for Khaled Said. From the beginning, after Said's death at the hands of police in June 2010, the "Kullena Khaled Said"[13] page worked to establish a particular narrative, both about the fate of Said and about the lives of other young men in the Arab region. Ghonim positioned his page against a similar page: "My Name is Khaled Said," which was (in his opinion) angry, exclusive, and extreme. Ghonim's page used nonconfrontational language and was studiedly non-partisan. Ghonim's first post as admin of the site read "Today they killed Khaled. If I don't act for his sake, tomorrow they will kill me," but others, like "Egyptians, my justice is in your hands," are written from the perspective of Khaled (Ghonim 60). The page called for justice for Said and to respond to the Egyptian regime's attempts to excuse Said's death by slandering him (rumors were

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[12] Tunisian Ben Ali was known for using MSA exclusively, and in the three speeches he delivered in the final weeks of his presidency, he promised first changes in unemployment and regime, and only in his final speech spoke to Tunisians in their own dialect, acknowledging their anger and saying to them "I hear you now" (Liberman).

[13] Arabic for "All of us are Khaled Said."

spread that he was hiding drugs, wanted for sexual assault, had evaded his military service, and other damning crimes). But the page also called attention to similar abuses by the police, and even applauded upstanding police officers. Ghonim's original goal was to use the page to call for an end to police brutality, but the group's goals expanded as the page's popularity grew.

"Kullena Khaled Said" also served to link others together in a narrative of recognition that extended across the region. Similar pages sprouted in Tunisia and Yemen, and an English version (named "We Are All Khaled Said") allowed far-flung supporters to identify with and support Egyptians. As mentioned above, Egypt had been under emergency rule for three decades, and many of the page's members would not have remembered a time when they could not be arrested for any sign of rebellion or protest. When Ghonim asked members to photograph themselves holding signs with the page's name, hoping to overcome the long-standing fear of being identified that resulted from the emergency rule, he was astonished by the response (66). Egyptians of all ages and backgrounds participated, but photos were also posted from across the region as men and women in other countries sympathized and identified with Said's life, and mourned his death. Ghonim recalls that "a pregnant woman sent us an ultrasonographic image of her fetus with a caption that read: "My name is Khaled, and I'm coming to the world in three months. I will never forget Khaled Said and I will demand justice for his case"" (69). Members were able to use the pictures to put very diverse faces to one another, while reinforcing their collective goals.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, my objective hasn't been simply to point out that the *Economist*'s "Shoe-Throwers' Index" doesn't work, or to suggest that the factors used to craft the Index don't matter, or don't create the sort of unrest in citizens that ends in protest or revolution. Nor is it to say

definitively that the rhetoric used by protesters was simply "better" than that of Arab leaders, or stronger than a timely food subsidy. Instead, my interest has been in what the Index, both in what it includes, and in what it attempts, tells us about how we define citizenship. The logic of mathematics represented here by the Index is one which tries to quantify what citizens want, but in doing so it imposes a set of conditions that it argues add up to a contented population. Rhetoric argues that in order to persuade, the rhetor must know her audience, and must start from where they are. By contrast, the predictive logic of the Index assumes that only the material conditions of citizens' lives mean anything. It cannot even account for the impact of something like "Kullena Khaled Said." In falling under the sway of predictive logic, we reduce citizens' actions to stimulus response rather than hearing them and being heard by them, and we risk buying into a definition of citizenship which fails to take into account their lived experiences.

Chapter 5 Toward a Rhetorical Approach to Citizenship

My goal in this project has been to make a case for a form of citizenship which exists outside of the institutions and processes that officially regulate and encourage civic engagement. In doing so, I have employed a definition of citizenship in which citizens share positions of stance and judgment about public problems, but do not necessarily do so through official channels. The desire to deliberate and work on public issues in this citizenship can occur alongside the working of the government, as when individuals or groups make choices about their own resource use or lifestyle, or they can occur in opposition to the working of the government, as is the case in many protests and revolutions. By this definition, the examples in the preceding chapters - Keep Louisville Weird, the WTO demonstrations in Seattle, and the Arab Spring - are very much acts of citizenship.

In examining these case studies as examples of citizenship, my primary objective has been exactly that - to bring them under the umbrella of citizenship. The goal is not to imply, however, that these groups are somehow "doing it right" while those dedicated voters who cast ballots, or write letters to their representatives are failing in some fashion to perform citizenship fully. While it's not my intention to recommend working within the system at all costs, neither is it my intention to dismiss those who do.

Nor do I want to lionize my examples or exclude similar performances of citizenship with agendas I do not sympathize with. I have very real concerns about buying locally, the alliances built in Seattle had little staying power, and Egypt (among other Arab League nations) continues to experience turmoil. And while I may feel more sympathy for these examples than I do for groups who picket abortion clinics, or who profess unconditional love of the Confederacy (as has occurred in South Carolina this spring as students protested the College of Charleston's new

president while meeting opposition from counter-protesters carrying the stars and bars), their drive to participate outside the channels of institutional citizenship is no less valid than that of the groups in my case studies.

So rather than promoting one group or political agenda over another, the point has been to ask to what extent pinning labels like "lifestyle," "battle," "revolution," on these movements (and others) prohibits us from examining them as acts of citizenship, and thus keeps us from even being able to have a conversation about who is or is not "doing it right." Because they are not always recognized as acting as citizens, none can possibly be doing it right, and therefore we judge their actions according to how much they do or don't inconvenience us, or how much they disagree or agree with us.

Instead, the preceding chapters reveal a model of citizenship which demonstrates our desire to embrace our situatedness. The participants of the movements described here do not want a citizenship disconnected from the places they live, or from their economic conditions and everyday choices. They do not want a politics they only observe, or which they influence only occasionally, and through strictly regulated channels that many find daunting and inadequate. Their voices are made up of, as the slogan goes, their votes, but also any other tool that comes to hand. Signs, slogans, and stickers, dance, street theatre, and song, their physical bodies and virtual comments, tattoos and Twitter, even fire and broken windows. In sharing their convictions with others, and with exploring solutions to problems, they want to utilize all the available means. This is, in my mind, a dynamic citizenship, with great potential, but it is often a messy citizenship as well. As the case studies also reveal, there are debates about the validity and effectiveness of this model of citizenship. Buy local advocates often have little influence in official decisions about development, leaving them at the mercy of others. For all its cultural

power, when ear X-tacy was finally forced to leave the Highlands, Keep Louisville Weird was unable to convince the owners of the building to ensure the next tenant would be a local business. Protesters and revolutionaries risk injury, imprisonment, and death, and may also be unable to exert much influence. To return to Bordoni's division between the nation and the state, a decision to align with the state doesn't mean that we don't still have to live in, and contend with, the nation. We may choose to participate outside of institutional citizenship, but we can't escape the impact of those institutions, as the "Seattle 600" learned. Operating outside means that we risk being dismissed, or directly opposed, because there are not always rights and protections associated with extra-institutional citizenship. The question, then, is whether the version of citizenship I have described in this project can offer a valid option, when compared to a more traditional, institutional model of citizenship?

In what follows, I want to discuss some of the reasons behind our preference for institutional citizenship, as well as continue the conversation begun in the first chapter about the ways that institutional citizenship falls short of its promise. I also want to examine some of our reasons for distrusting the extra-institutional citizenship of my case studies. As the preceding chapters have likely made clear, the type of citizenship I am describing here is often slow-moving, and contentious, with no guarantee of success. But I hope to make a case for this slower, messier citizenship, and to sketch out some ways that the study of rhetoric can contribute to better understanding it.

ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE

In part, it's likely that we are reluctant to expand our definition of citizenship because institutional politics at least promises inclusion for all, and shows what appear to be definite and measurable results. In theory, with institutional citizenship everyone has equal access to fair

treatment under the law, one vote to cast however they wish, and the same potential for real world impact. The classic example is, of course, elections, where the will of the people is expressed through the tally of votes and the choice of a candidate. The people choose representatives at both local and national levels, and if those representatives should somehow fail, or the people rethink their choice of them, there are processes in place for overturning decisions, impeaching officials, and making requests to the branches of our government. The point of all of these processes is to ensure that citizens have a minimum level of access to and influence with their government, regardless of class, age (once adulthood is attained), gender, race, education, sexuality, or other considerations.

Citizenship in this system is a collection of rights, including the right to participate in government by choosing representatives. This means that citizens have an incentive to participate, inasmuch as they wish to protect or expand their rights, and that would-be representatives have an incentive to respond to their constituents, inasmuch as they wish to gain or remain in office. Individual rights are established, interpreted, revised, and protected by a host of other institutions, and citizens agree to abide by them, treating one another with tolerance, if not with acceptance.

In the realm of institutional citizenship, change most often occurs through election, as the body of citizens replaces its representatives with others that seem better able to serve their needs. But increasingly, as we have come to focus more on citizenship as a collection of rights, litigation has become a powerful tool for social change. In her book, *Rights Talk*, Mary Ann Glendon argues that ours has always been a society heavily influenced by the law and lawyers, and this has led to a particularly strong culture of personal rights. Rights culture intensified, Glendon says, in the decades following World War II, as advocates for social change turned to

the courts in order to combat the institutionalized racism or sexism of some of our laws. A political sphere dominated by well-financed groups, and the growing tendency of politicians to take a moderate stance have only reinforced the notion that the courts are the best place for citizens to achieve substantial change.

On the surface, this is all to the good. For many of us, an interest in personal rights reflects our investment in personal liberty, and a desire to see justice done. Abolishing laws which allow the exploitation or mistreatment of others, and establishing laws which extend protection to previously excluded groups are admirable goals. Moreover, the realm of litigation, especially in a diverse society like ours, where it is difficult to establish a single dominant public view on any issue, can lead to quicker and more definitive victories than the quarrelsome, compromise-hampered realm of politics.

LIMITATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP

Without dismissing the benefits of rights-based citizenship or litigation as a tool for social change, though, I want to consider how they also show the limitations of institutional citizenship. There are drawbacks to imagining our citizenship primarily as a collection of individual rights. In the *Rhetoric*, it is Aristotle who argues that we require rhetoric in part because while we may endeavor to create a just system of law, it is impossible to craft laws which cover every possibility (1.13.13). Even if it were, not everyone will agree about what constitutes justice or injustice, and in referring to "fairness" as "justice that goes beyond the written law" (1.13.13) Aristotle points out the limitations of simply determining whether someone has the right to do something or not. What we may do is not necessarily what we ought to do.

Glendon echoes this by asserting that our responsibilities to one another get buried in rights. It is easy to see how this might happen. Some demand the right to practice or espouse their faith while others demand the right to an education or workplace free of the faiths of others. In the heated conversations around the Affordable Care Act, we have grown accustomed to hearing some employees demand the right to decide for themselves whether they seek certain medical care (such as contraception) while employers demand the right not to provide services they are morally opposed to. Debates over how to handle bullying become debates about what school-age students have a right to do and say to one another, debates about what protections they are entitled to, and where the lines between them should be drawn. In 2011, for example, after the Kentucky House Education Committee passed a bill extending protection from bullying to gay students, Representative Mike Harmon wanted to amend the bill to protect the right of religious students to express their disapproval of homosexuality. His proposed amendment allowed for any expression short of physical damaging gay, lesbian, or bisexual students or their property (Chrislove). The question of how Kentucky students ought to treat one another is lost in a scuffle to ensure that no one's rights are stepped on.

Those of us who teach undoubtedly see a similar sleight of hand when we attempt to introduce controversial issues in the classroom. I have often assigned readings criticizing or promoting buy-local movements, and asked my students for a response. Those who disagree with the movements frequently discuss their right to shop wherever they please. Although it is less common, some who support the movements use the same language to suggest that they have a right to more diverse shopping experiences in their cities, but they struggle to provide a rebuttal to their peers' insistence on the right to promiscuous shopping. They are keenly aware that it is vital not to violate the rights of others, including, of course, the right of others to a personal

opinion. Just as my students find that talk of rights often closes down rhetorical exchange, Glendon observes that rights talk "[forecloses] further communication with those whose points of view differ from our own," because "the language of rights is the language of no compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has to get out of town. The conversation is over" (Glendon 9).

There are other problems with the promise of electoral and legislative politics. In spite of the equality and inclusion institutions seem to promise, the reality is often otherwise. For many of us, there is a gap between the promise of legal and political equality, and the realization of equality. As mentioned in the first chapter, T.H. Marshall's often-cited essay, "Citizenship and Social Class," divides citizenship into three elements: civil, political, and social. Civil citizenship is composed of those "rights necessary for individual freedom," such as "liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought, and faith," the rights to justice and to own property and enter into contracts (10). Political citizenship gives us the right to participate politically, either by holding political office, or by electing those who hold office. Civil citizens are guaranteed certain protections, and political citizens are permitted to help shape the policies of the world they live in. These elements encompass much of what I refer to when I reference the electoral and legal politics that we are most comfortable associating with citizenship. Social citizenship is more tricky. For Marshall it consists of "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live […] according to the standards prevailing in the society" (11). Social citizenship is a crucial element because while civil rights bestow certain legal powers on citizens, the use of those powers is "drastically curtailed by class prejudice and lack of economic opportunity," and political rights provide citizens with a "potential power whose exercise demand[s] experience, [and

]organisation" (46). This point of view recognizes that without the means to participate fully in a society, being technically granted the right to do so is unhelpful.

Sixty years later, Marshall's observations remain relevant. Saskia Sassen argues that "the principle of equal citizenship remains unfulfilled," because "Groups defined by race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and other 'identities' still face various exclusions from full participation in public life. This is especially so at the level of practices even in the face of changes in the formal legal status...In brief, legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights because those rights are often conditioned by the position of different groups within a nation state" ("Incompleteness" 239). There is still a sizeable gap between the legal and political rights we are granted and how fully we are able to enjoy them. Each citizen is entitled to vote, and voting costs nothing, but this right is available only to citizens with a permanent residence, and increasingly, only to citizens with the proper form of identification. Recently proposed photo identification laws, cited as necessary to reduce voter fraud, are likely to reduce voter turnout among the young, elderly, and disabled, particularly when they hail from the lower economic classes. Similarly, debates over extending voting hours to include weekends remind us that not all citizens have equal command over their transportation, work schedules, and child care. If I can vote, but am unable to get to my polling station without risking my employment, exercising this right becomes significantly more expensive. And while anyone may aspire to public office, wealth heavily influences the outcome of elections, putting candidates with fewer funds at a disadvantage. Institutions that traditionally worked in support of candidates friendly to the working class, such as unions, have declined in power, while super PACs supported by extremely wealthy individuals and corporations dominate elections.

Similarly, our civil citizenship is curtailed without social equality. The right to own property, as Marshall puts it, is only the right "to acquire it if you can, and to protect it, if you can get it," while "freedom of speech has little real substance if, from lack of education, you have nothing to say that is worth saying and no means of making yourself heard if you say it" (35). Just as importantly, as our rights expand, it becomes more likely that without a certain level of education, or access to legal counsel, citizens may be unaware that their rights have been violated. Increasingly, as public schools falter, adequate education is the result of economic class, and both legal counsel and litigation can cost a great deal in terms of money and time. For Marshall, the solution to these inequalities is institutions fostering social citizenship, which grant minimum levels of education, and access to health care, food, housing, and income. Under neoliberal globalization, though, social services in the United States have been eroded, so that social citizenship has fallen significantly behind its civil and political siblings.

Even if we acquire sufficient social citizenship, electoral and legislative politics can be very isolating. At the national level, issues often seem remote, and our own voice or vote can be lost in the sheer size of a diverse population. This is complicated, argues Hauser, by a media which reduces complex issues to sound bites, and substitutes "raw response" for discourse (2). Media outlets gather information through phone polls (we might add Twitter and Facebook) and present the results to us as graphics, statistics, or sample quotations that offer little opportunity for discussion or reflection (2). We are isolated from one another, encountering "the public as a faceless, anonymous body whose members are reduced to the number having selected predetermined choices to a poller's questions and who enter our homes as media reports of data" (4). In my own experience, watching friends respond moment-to-moment on Facebook or Twitter to the 2012 presidential debates, commentary is vivid, pointed, humorous - but fleeting.

While these social media sites do allow for more sustained discussion, it is less common; the live-tweeter who pauses to unpack something or debate a point risks falling behind, missing out on an opportunity to comment on the next thing.

Fleming's *City of Rhetoric* also describes the isolation of electoral and legislative politics, arguing that we often conceptualize citizenship as national, and thus too large for us to comfortably manage. In contrast, he adds, we view local politics as an alternative, but find this isolating in a different way. At the local level, given the homogeneity of our neighborhoods, it is less likely that we will grapple with real difference. We are caught between a politics too big for us, where issues are too complex to be fully grasped and our vote seems meaningless, and a politics too small for us, where we are isolated from citizens "not like us."

Legislative politics in particular can cut us off from others, partially, as Glendon notes, by making the individual's rights primary in our citizenship. But legislative politics can also reduce our participation by moving the question of what should be done into the courts. As an example, the last few years have seen an increase in rulings in many states over whether to recognize or permit same-sex marriages, and as a supporter of marriage equality, I have been keenly interested in the outcome of these rulings. When my schedule and circumstances permit, I watch the news, and when they don't, I check my phone at intervals for text messages and Facebook posts with updates. Watching these rulings unfold from a space like Facebook, however, demonstrates the political alienation scholars like Hauser and Fleming are describing. I encounter the rest of the country as those who favor or oppose a decision that it often feels none of us will decide - they become percentages on a poll, or those who do and do not circulate memes supporting or mocking a proposed change. And though I can, and do, interact with those individuals where they appear in my real or virtual networks, in many ways I am, as Fleming

notes, "little more than a spectator of it" (38). My colleagues, friends, and I are observers, waiting for someone else, somewhere else, to validate or reject our values, and in spite of the excitement of awaiting the ruling, and the triumph we may feel if we welcome the outcome, there is still a sense of powerlessness. Unless we happen to be a person of interest in these cases, our role is to accept the ruling, even if we "accept" it by denouncing it. Few of us will ever be involved in any appeals to these rulings, either. Like spectators at a basketball game, we might be annoyed with a referee, or yell at the coach to contest a call, but we are doing so from a distance, unable to influence the situation.

Many of the issues which most concern us, moreover, are not automatically subject either to electoral or legal politics. Dana Cloud points out that facets of our lives where we are most vulnerable, like economic relations, are largely excluded from formal politics, with the result that we have little or no power to make decisions about our economic lives. As she points out, "We do not vote over our wages, work hours, employment benefits, or the accessibility of child care and health care," because under capitalism these are considered private, rather than public concerns (164). How can we achieve measurable change as individual voters, when these concerns exist outside institutional boundaries?

The rights based citizenship that has grown from electoral and legislative politics, at least in its current manifestation, can be rhetorically disabling, then. If rhetoric deals with the uncertain, where there are questions about what the problem is, or what ought to be done about the problem, these politics shut down rhetorical exchange and move us away from those questions toward statements about what the law does or does not permit. The process stops being one of discussing and finding solutions to public problems, or of determining our responsibilities to one another as members of a community, and becomes one of determining an individual's

right to marry, to receive benefits, to visit a hospitalized partner or spouse, to adopt or protect their children. While obtaining these rights is no small thing, I want to suggest that it isn't everything. Rights-based citizenship may grant me the freedom to marry my partner, but it cannot grant me the respect of my fellow citizens. Tolerance is not integration. As Representative Harmon's amendment demonstrates, we tolerate situations only until we have the power to change them, or until the cost of enduring them outweighs the cost of acting on them. And, as the last few presidential elections have proven, the definitiveness of electoral politics does little to promote cooperation. Electoral and legislative politics give us neat, concrete answers to questions, but cannot assist us in living productively with those answers.

"JUST TALK"

These discrepancy between the promise of institutional citizenship and the reality are the reason for my belief that we need a way of thinking about and talking about citizenship that encompasses extra-institutional participation. If the examples in this project are all ways of being citizens, though, why are we confused or hostile about them? What explains our reluctance to include activities that can't be easily institutionalized?

In the case of protests, strikes, and other demonstrations, it is not hard to see where hostility comes from. Residents of Seattle trying to get to work or school were likely as displeased as the WTO delegates to be stopped by human chains, signs of protest, and dancing sea turtles. Others, out trying to complete Christmas shopping or enjoy dinner at a restaurant during the demonstrations, ran the risk of being injured by police or protesters, and clouds of gas drifted into areas not officially included in the protest. Whether the windows broken during the demonstrations constitute "violence" or not, they were nonetheless illegal acts, and it is

unsurprising if the majority of citizens do not recognize actions which break the law as part of a legitimate citizenship.

On the other end of the spectrum, though, it is possible that the everydayness of this citizenship sometimes has a hand in de-legitimizing it. Voting and jury duty are activities we perform only at intervals - sometimes very long intervals - as opposed to purchasing goods and services, which we may undertake on a daily basis. These practices can be easily divorced from their potential for political significance. It is possible to shop locally unintentionally (merely because it is convenient) or to do so without identifying with a movement, but no one accidentally participates in an election. There is a purposefulness and exceptionalness to these activities which makes it easier to identify them as part of our civic lives, as opposed to our private lives.

Even when participants identify as members of a movement with an articulated political agenda, it is unclear, to many, what these extra-institutional acts of citizenship accomplish. This, Jacobs, Cook, and Carpini suggest, is why we are so skeptical of discursive participation, which is often dismissed as "just talk" (3). Instead, even as we find institutional citizenship alienating or insufficient, they argue that we nonetheless yearn for the "institutional guarantees found in electoral or legislative politics" (3), such as clear and measurable results. Unlike casting a vote in an election, it is harder to measure the failure or success of "your side" when buying locally or protesting. The insistence, in the case of Seattle, to measure success or failure by determining what caused the Millennium Round of talks to fail (assuming you accept the premise of their failure) is a manifestation of this need for measurable results. Some participants of these movements comfort themselves with the knowledge that their actions will raise awareness, but

many of us require more tangible goals. Without something to point to, it is easy to become disillusioned.

Nor does extra-institutional citizenship escape the same problems of access and influence I referenced above in institutional citizenship. There are very real issues of class, gender, and race in the examples I've chosen. The realities of buying locally often mean that participants are limited to those able to live and shop in vibrant, middle-class neighborhoods - and it is telling that while Keep Louisville Weird has shaped the faces of the Highlands and Crescent Hill, it hasn't achieved much presence in downtown Louisville itself, or neighborhoods with similar conditions of poverty. Louivillians, as seen through this movement, are between 25 and 50, white, and middle-class. Similarly, critics have pointed out the "lack of color" in Seattle[14] (Martinez). While the demonstrations drew participants from around the world, the majority of those protesting in Seattle's streets were young and white, and quite a few were financially stable. Speaking for myself, although I could have managed to get time off from work in 1999, and perhaps I could even have scraped together the travel fare, it would have been a crippling blow to my finances for months afterward. In general, I lacked the funding and free time to travel across the country. Moreover, I only knew of the events at all because friends in the city telephoned me - in the pre-smart-phone days of the late 90s, only members of the middle class would have had the ready internet access necessary to stay informed and involved in planning the demonstrations. Even in Egypt, where poverty and unemployment are often very high, the "face" of the Arab Spring revolutionary for most Americans was a young man, college-educated, English-speaking, and tech-savvy. The "Twitter revolution" assumed a certain level of access and familiarity with technology. Even if many of us believe in these movements, not all of us have the capacity to participate in them.

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[14] A criticism that emerged again with Occupy Wall Street.

SO WHY BOTHER?

The practices of extra-institutional citizenship are not only uncertain, but also contentious - as my case studies demonstrate. The everydayness of some practices causes them to be lost in the sea of personal choices, while practices such as emotional speech, picketing, sit-ins and occupations - even when they are peaceful and legal - may inconvenience or discomfit others. Reactions to these practices can range from indifference or dismissal, through scorn, anger, and verbal attacks, all the way to physical attacks, imprisonment, and beyond.

This is not to say that our politics now is never contentious; it is, of course. But this contention is managed and mitigated by the institutions that determine and protect our rights, and it is held in check by our recognition of one another as citizens. We may dislike or criticize those who vote for candidates we oppose, but we do not call for their arrest, or argue that what they do is meaningless. Even those who accuse Green Party and other Independent supporters of "wasting" their votes acknowledge through this criticism that these voters can affect the outcome for other candidates. Given the political atmosphere of the last decade, of decreased bipartisan cooperation, and increased voter frustration with bickering politicians, we might wonder whether further conflict is really what's needed.

There are reasons to embrace contention, however, and to view it as potentially productive. As much as we might aspire to the unified state embodied in the phrase "We The People," Allen argues that it is "wholeness, not oneness," which should function as our guiding principle, and that we should be asking "what modes of citizenship can make a citizenry whole without covering up difference?" (19). In avoiding conflict, we often silence others, because disagreement is avoided by asking others to be reasonable, a request that tends to rely on a definition of reason that codes anything emotional as "unreasonable." This request polices our

responses, and ignores the possibility that outrage or sorrow may be the most appropriate response to a public problem. The request to be reasonable ties our hands and tells us to get out of the streets and go on enduring the foreclosure of our homes or the loss of our public libraries while we move slowly through the official channels. In other circumstances, the desire to avoid conflict leads us to make consensus our top priority. When this is the case, we don't enter into negotiation planning to do the least harm to the environment, or to benefit the greatest number of people, or even to expose one another to the full range of positions, but simply to find solutions we all agree on. These are likely to be few, and minor, leaving all participants with the sensation that nothing has changed.

Disagreement is not necessarily a sign that we have a problem, and in fact can be a sign that we live in a vibrant and healthy democracy. The discursive practices of a healthy democracy should include debate, questions, even challenges and demands. A citizenry that disagrees with one another, and with their representatives, on public issues is a citizenry engaged with those issues and better prepared for democratic participation. Will Kymlicka argues that "the ability and willingness to engage in public discourse about matters of public policy, and to question authority" are "perhaps the most distinctive aspects of citizenship in a liberal democracy" (296). It is exactly the question of whether we are willing and able to argue with one another that prompts Marshall to insist on the necessity of social citizenship, and which leads Willey to argue that residents who don't know or care about local issues and elections have stopped being citizens. Hauser says simply "a democratic rhetoric is untidy" (273).

For all its messiness, dispute and disagreement can also be rewarding. In grappling with difficult issues we come to better understand the positions and motivations of those around us, and we are forced to better articulate our own positions and the motivations behind them. Only

through engaging with others can we begin "moving from purely private preoccupations to the formation of judgments related to pressing issues of common concern" (Jacobs et al Ch. 1). We are able to include not only questions of individual rights and responsibilities, but questions about how best to live with one another, pursuing our often very different goals while respecting those who disagree with us. If the relative tidiness of institutional politics has led to isolation and apathy for many citizens, there may be reason to consider the benefits of messiness.

SITUATING THIS PROJECT

The rhetorical approach I have taken in this project has something to offer the field of citizenship studies. Within this field, there is a divide concerning what citizenship means, and how it should be defined. On one side of this divide, we find theorists like Peter Levine, who argue for a largely political definition of citizenship, one where our civic identities are framed around actions. On the other side are thinkers like Richard Bellamy, for whom citizenship is more about a legal status. Although both believe in the importance of civic engagement, one side images citizenship as something one *does* while the other imagines it as something we *are.*

Both sides are also concerned with citizenship as it relates to the nation-state, and its institutions. Particularly as questions are raised about whether the increasingly porous national borders for capitalism have resulted in a "post-citizen" world, or whether they will invite a new global citizenship. How, scholars in citizenship studies ask, can we foster greater civic engagement?

While both Levine and Bellamy are interested in whether, how, and how often citizens participate, they are less interested in how citizens view their own actions, and how they frame themselves as engaged citizens both inside and outside of institutions. Attention to how citizens view themselves, and how their discursive practices shape what it means to be a citizen is

something rhetorical studies can contribute to scholarship about citizenship. It asks us, as I have argued here, to expand what we think citizenship can means, and opens the study of citizenship up to look more closely at alternative ways of working together on public problems.

In each of my examples, our reluctance to view the movements as citizenship causes us to frame them in ways that cut participants off from one another, denying them a collective political identity. In Louisville, those who support Keep Louisville Weird are framed as customers rather than citizens, seen as exercising personal choices in consumption instead of working together to shape the life of their city. In Seattle, accounts on both sides focus on the personal reasons protesters had for being in the streets. They acquire a shared identity as soldiers (who follow the orders of a superior) or as dupes (who have bought into messages disseminated by another), but no shared identity that allows them political agency. And attempts to make sense of the Arab Spring such as the Shoe-Throwers' Index reduce citizens of Arab League nations to a sameness equally disabling - all become part of a faceless, nameless mass that reacts to a set of material conditions in the same way across all borders and differences. To pay attention to the ways that these participants frame themselves as engaged citizens expands what citizenship can mean, and grants political agency to these groups, allowing their voices to be better heard.

This means that a rhetorical approach to citizenship has value outside of academia, as well. I argued above that legal and electoral politics are well-suited to telling us the results of decisions, but not as useful for helping us live with those decisions. It is here that I believe rhetorical studies has something to offer, by providing an approach to politics and our place in it willing to embrace uncertainty and disagreement, without viewing one another as enemies, or misguided dupes. The art of rhetoric is not one of manipulating an unthinking and unreflective audience, but one of "putting as persuasive an argument as possible to an audience and then

leaving actual choices of action to them" (Allen 141). In order to take a rhetorical approach, we must be prepared to trust those we attempt to persuade, rather than viewing them as evil, or as enemies to be thwarted at all costs. We must be prepared to make our cases, or defend our positions, in terms which will be understood by and compelling to others who may come to the bargaining table with from places very different from our own. In order to persuade them, we will need to understand, as best we can, what their concerns and hopes are likely to be.

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ABSTRACT

ACTING OUT CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXTS

by

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This dissertation argues for a more inclusive definition of citizenship by suggesting that it is best understood as the ability and desire to work on public problems with others. In the Westphalian nation-state, citizenship is often understood to be a collection of legal and political rights determined and administered through institutions. These institutions fail to account for the desire of individuals to express convictions and work on problems that they experience locally. Our lived experience of citizenship exceeds the boundaries of institutions, but these actions are often dismissed as a result of the rhetoric used to talk about citizenship and public problems. The argument examines three examples - consumption, protest, and revolution - through the Keep Louisville Weird movement, the 1999 demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle, and the Arab Spring. Only by including acts such as these, not normally recognized as citizenship, can we construct a definition of citizenship that takes into account the lived experiences of citizens.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Whitney Hardin hails from the South, and has been a factory worker, a baker's assistant, a technical support representative, and a junior archivist, as well as a teacher. She received her BA in English from the University of Louisville and her MA in Literature from the University of Cincinnati. She received her PhD from Wayne State University, where she has been a Graduate Teaching Assistant and recipient of the DeRoy Memorial Scholarship and the Rumble Dissertation Fellowship. Her work focuses on the relationship between rhetoric and citizenship, and she has presented papers at SLSA, CCCC, and the Conference for Citizenship Studies. She has recently accepted a position as Assistant Professor of Communication at Kettering University.